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Societal Forces That ERODE Creativity

by Robert Sternberg & James C. Kaufman - 2018

Background/Context: Creativity is an indispensable force in intellectual, social, cultural, and economic development. Yet societal forces conspire to erode it. Educators have despaired for many years over how schools often fail to encourage creativity, but society as a whole is just as guilty. But how do schools and society fail to encourage, or actually even erode, creativity? This essay addresses this question.

Purpose/Objective/Research Question/Focus of Study: The goal of our research was to specify the specific societal forces that erode creativity. We have labeled these forces ERODE: Education, Resources, Opportunities, Diffusion, and Exaggeration. The bottom line is that, although our society claims to want creativity, it most wants it when no one is negatively affected. Because creativity almost always negatively affects some people and groups, society tends to be much more supportive of creativity in theory than in practice. We show why.

Research Design: Our research design is an analysis of the forces in society that erode creativity. We used historical analysis, media analysis, and analysis of educational practice to draw our conclusions.

When one looks at the disarray in the world, one might think the dire predictions of some scientists that intelligence is declining were in fact coming true (Woodley, te Nijenhuis, & Murphy, 2013). Evidence to the contrary, however, is that the aspect of intelligence measured by IQ increased globally in the 20th century (Neisser, 1998), and in many parts of the world it is still increasing (Flynn, 2012). On one hand, IQ tests provide an incomplete picture of intelligence (Kaufman, 2015; Sternberg, 1981a, 1984, 1990, 1997; Sternberg & Smith, 1985); on the other hand, they are predictive of many outcomes in everyday life and hence are useful at a population level, if not always at an individual level (Deary & Whalley, 2008).

Perhaps, though, the world should be more worried about what is happening over time to levels of creativity than what is happening to levels of intelligence. Almost every convenience we have in our lives we owe to the creativity of our own and earlier generations: computers and cell phones, of course, but ovens, paper clips, cruise control, and even toilets (think about the alternatives). And of course, the books we like to read and the music we like to hear and the movies and shows we like to watch are also results of human creativity.

Some work (e.g., Kim, 2011) has proclaimed a creativity crisis after finding declining scores on divergent-thinking tests. Despite the public attention paid to this study, declining scores were found only on figural tests, and not verbal ones; a subsequent study found that declines—or increases—in creativity were strongly linked to domain (Weinstein, Clark, DiBartolomeo, & Davis, 2014). In other words, it is not meaningful to talk just about increases or decreases in creativity: One needs to specify the domain in which creativity is being applied, because creativity is largely domain-specific (Baer, 2010).

In addition to suggesting that much more research is needed, this work also points to a deeper issue: Creativity is even harder to measure than is intelligence (Kaufman, Plucker, & Russell, 2012; Lubart & Sternberg, 1988; Plucker & Makel, 2010; Sternberg & Lubart, 1992), and it certainly has commanded much less interest from test publishers (Kaufman, 2015).

Creativity involves both skills and attitudes, and existing measures are narrow at best (Plucker & Makel, 2010; see also full set of essays in Kaufman & Sternberg, 2010). The measures that are easier and cheaper to administer have been criticized for relying too strongly on intelligence (Lee & Therriault, 2013) or for not transferring to real-life creativity (Baer, 2011). Conversely, actually measuring creative products—perhaps the most “real-life” system that exists—is fraught with expense, effort, and questions of practicality (Kaufman & Baer, 2012).

Tests such as those of Guilford (Guilford, 1967; Guilford & Hoepfner, 1966) and Torrance (1974) attempt to measure creativity but do so at a level that is different from that of everyday life, and certainly from that of professional life. People may occasionally have to think of unusual uses of products like paper clips, but it is more likely that they will have problems at the level of how to get an unruly child to behave after repeated attempts have failed, how to get a new business rolling in a bad economy, how to revamp one’s expenses to meet a severe drop in income, or how to get to work when the usual transit roads are closed due to flooding. And of course, professionals use creativity at an even higher level, in artwork, literature, science, engineering, or wherever.

Creativity is hard to measure and even harder to measure at a level appropriate to the challenges many of us face in our lives. Nevertheless, there have been various attempts to measure a higher level of creativity than that assessed by the Torrance (1974) and Guilford (1967) assessments.

Sternberg and his colleagues (see Chart, Grigorenko, & Sternberg, 2008; Niu & Sternberg, 2002; Sternberg, 2003b, 2010, 2016; Sternberg, Bonney, Gabora, Karelitz, & Coffin, 2010; Sternberg, Bonney, Gabora, & Merrifield, 2012; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995) have attempted to measure creativity at a level higher than that provided by the types of measures used by Guilford and Torrance. For example, they asked participants to write creative stories using two of about a dozen unusual titles provided by the investigators (e.g., “The Octopus’s Sneakers,” “The Professor Disappeared,” and “Confessions of a Middle-School Bully”); to orally tell creative stories based on visual collages (such as of athletes or musicians); to write stories of imaginary future histories (“What might have happened if the South had won the U.S. Civil War?”); or to design scientific experiments, draw artistic compositions, and so forth.

The investigators found, using these assessments, that they could improve the prediction of academic as well as of extracurricular performance in college and also substantially decrease ethnic-group differences in test performance. Moreover, the tests were practical. They have been used on tens of thousands of students applying to college or in college and have changed who is admitted to some colleges, so that students who are creative have a chance to be admitted to colleges that their SAT or ACT scores alone likely would have placed beyond their reach (Sternberg, 2010, 2016). Finally, students enjoy taking these measures, contrary to the experience of many students taking conventional standardized tests.

Nevertheless, whether creativity can be measured precisely or not, we have to worry about it. Apart from the numerous personal benefits creativity holds (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009), it is also the foundation of all innovation (West, 2002). We, as a society, do not want to end up worrying only about those things that are easy to measure; such constructs are not the most important ones to consider and may be less important than more nebulous human attributes such as creativity.

Given how important creativity is to our lives and to society (Ananiadou & Claro, 2009), one might expect our society would go to great lengths to encourage, nurture, and reward creativity. If it does, the signs are hard to find, at least in the business of education and academia. If anything, societal forces seem to erode creativity. First, textbooks have few or no exercises encouraging creative thinking. Second, standardized tests measure creative thinking minimally or not at all (Sternberg, 1981b); indeed, creative responses are more likely to be punished than rewarded (Kaufman, 2010). Third, teachers are usually not trained in recognizing or nurturing creativity and may unintentionally squelch student creativity as they are tasked to pursue higher test scores (Beghetto, 2013; Beghetto & Kaufman, 2014). Although there are many efforts on the part of teachers to foster creativity in schools (see, e.g., Craft, 2004), teachers often do so at their own initiative and with the fear that they will be chastised if their students’ standardized-test scores fall below administrative expectations. Fourth, federal initiatives such as No Child Left Behind and the Common Core tend to ignore creativity or simply include it as a possible way to increase student engagement (Beghetto, Kaufman, & Baer, 2014). Fifth, admissions procedures to successively higher levels of education have little room for creativity. Even the essays, for the most part, are fairly conventional stuff; being too creative in an admissions essay can represent a genuine risk (Kaufman, 2016; Sternberg, 2010).

An additional problem is that teachers are rewarded not for creativity, but for toeing the line with regard to preparing students for standardized tests, which themselves do not measure creativity. The risks are that creative people will shy away from teaching as a profession and that a somewhat dysfunctional system that rewards conformity will encourage uncreative new people to enter the field. Those people, in turn, may most value people like themselves (Sternberg, 1987, 1998): namely, those who are not very creative.

The bottom line is that scholastic tests, in large part, are reflections of a what a society values, and tests in the United States and much of the world fail to measure, and hence to reward or even recognize, creativity. The tests primarily measure knowledge and analytical problem-solving and critical-thinking skills (Davidson & Sternberg, 2003); thus, society may end up with people who know a lot and, to some extent, can analyze what they know, but without a sufficient number of people who can, in a creative way, go beyond the information they have been given. Often, when students choose strategies that are a good match for their own abilities (Sternberg & Weil, 1980), society punishes rather than rewards them for doing things in a way other than that which is conventionally accepted. (The senior author’s children were explicitly told in preschool not to ask “why” things are done the way they are done.)

A larger problem, though, may be the mechanisms in society that fail to reward or can even punish creativity. Simply observing the trajectory of a life spent in pursuit of knowledge, from the classroom to advanced scholarship to the career of an academic, it seems that there are many active pitfalls that are actively eroding creativity. Indeed, our model for the erosion of creativity is called ERODE, which is an acronym for Education, Resources, Opportunities, Diffusion, and Exaggeration. We will discuss each of these five mechanisms in turn.


During the latter half of the 20th century, standardized testing played some role in education, but nothing like the role it plays today. Although many admissions tests were initially created for benevolent reasons, today standardized testing is a huge industry and an inevitable and often dreaded part of the educational enterprise. It is unclear whether standardized testing has improved the educational performance of our children (Kamenetz, 2015; Ravitch, 2011). What is clear is that testing greatly influences the way schools teach (Herman, 2004).

One could argue about whether standardized testing helps school achievement or even improves intelligence. To the extent that practicing and studying for standardized tests transfers from one test to another, one might expect some improvement in IQ or other test scores. Indeed, Brown, Roediger, and McDaniel (2014) presented persuasive evidence that retrieval practice—simply gaining practice in retrieving knowledge of any kind—improves memory for that knowledge. Tests require not only retrieving declarative knowledge, but also procedural knowledge: knowledge of how to do things. Retrieving procedural knowledge such as is required on standardized achievement tests almost certainly helps with retrieving procedural knowledge on IQ tests, because both involve very similar skills (Sternberg, 1999).

There are several reasons why our culture of standardized testing may actually have impeded creativity, however much it may help with performance on IQ or achievement tests.

First, the very skills that facilitate performance on an IQ test may impede creative thinking. For example, the measurement of creativity does not lend itself well to multiple-choice testing (Sternberg & The Rainbow Project Collaborators, 2005, 2006), and divergent creative thinking is in a sense almost the opposite of the kind of convergent thinking that produces a uniquely correct answer on a multiple-choice test.

Second, if one does try to be creative on a standardized test, there is no reward for it, and there may be a penalty. Even essay tests to measure writing skills are scored for the grammatical and analytical quality of the writing, not for creativity. Most essay tests are partly scored by computerized programs and partly by teachers or other experts who read thousands and thousands of essays at a time. Students are often advised that factors such as creativity or humor carry much more risk than potential benefit.

So what little opportunity there might be to be creative is taken away. In the senior author’s career, he tried being creative on his first essay test in college. The professor later explained the way he scored the essay tests: He had 10 points that he wanted students to make, and their score was the number of those points that they made. The junior author’s father tells a nearly identical story. So much for creativity.

Third, beyond the mere existence of standardized tests, society has created a “merit system” whereby individuals who are strong in the skills measured by standardized tests tend to get ahead in life and those who are not so strong in these skills face serious obstacles, such as in being admitted to high-quality colleges and graduate and professional schools (Sternberg, 1988, 2010, 2016). Thus, society, despite its professed interest in creativity, talks the talk but, at least in schools, fails to walk the walk. Students who are creative do not particularly profit from the way schools evaluate students. Their creativity may be noted in a letter of recommendation, but the currency for college admissions is standardized tests and grade point average (Zwick, 2013). If anything, as we will discuss further, creative students are punished.


When the senior author’s graduate adviser (Professor Gordon Bower) was starting his career as an academic psychologist, getting funded was mostly a matter of writing a grant proposal. He has reported, anecdotally, that if your proposal wasn’t awful, it was funded. By the time the senior author of this article was starting his career, your proposal could be funded, but only if it was good. Today, however, pay lines at granting agencies are so tight that often proposals have to be rated better than the top 10% to be funded. Funding in some fields other than psychology is better, but still very difficult.

There are sources besides federal agencies for funding, but such organizations tend to offer lower amounts and are also limited in resources. The challenge of limited funding is that it encourages conservatism in proposal writing: When the odds of being funded are very low, one cannot help but realize that taking risks is even riskier than usual. Creative work defies the crowd (Sternberg & Lubart, 1992) and hence, almost inevitably, invites resistance from established individuals in any field. If one writes a highly creative proposal, chances are close to 100% that at least some of the reviewers will be highly established researchers, and hence people who may feel threatened by research that wishes to challenge or even overturn the existing order. The result is that it is difficult to get highly creative research funded. The most creative researchers often find their grant proposals rejected (Sternberg, 2003a).

Thus, the current drought in funding has three risks. The first is that creative research will not be funded because the funds are not there. The second is that highly creative proposals are more likely to be rejected because reviewers will go for safe proposals that are highly likely to yield results (see Sternberg, 2013). The third risk is that researchers may choose to pursue safer, less creative proposals to increase their odds of being funded.

The resistance to new work is not restricted to granting agencies; it is in some ways a fundamental property of human nature. People like the status quo (Eidelman & Crandall, 2012). Indeed, people are more likely to favor something that has been around longer (Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010) or even that simply exists (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009). Consider the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 2001), which holds that repeated exposure to something makes us eventually prefer it.

This resistance to new things is also found in business. Consumers often resist creative products (Ram & Sheth, 1989); this is especially true of older consumers (Laukkanen, Sinkkonen, Kivijärvi, & Laukkanen, 2007). Opposition can be particularly notable when products come with higher perceived risk (Kleijnen, Lee, & Wetzels, 2009). It is unsurprising, therefore, that most creative products fail (Heidenreich & Spieth, 2013). The types of creative products most likely to succeed are very small steps forward that do not make radical changes (Sternberg, Kaufman, & Pretz, 2002).

Resistance to creativity, whether in the world of scholarship or the world at large, has deep roots. There are many instances of negative implicit attitudes toward creative people, ranging from general layperson bias under some circumstances (Mueller, Melwani, & Goncalo, 2012), to beliefs that creative people will be worse leaders (Mueller, Goncalo, & Kamdar, 2011), to teachers claiming to like creative students but unconsciously holding both untrue and negative beliefs about them (Aljughaiman & Mowrer-Reynolds, 2005; Westby & Dawson, 1995).

Terror-management theory holds that the recognition of one’s mortality can result in needing to feel interconnected with other people (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Given that creativity is often an individual pursuit (particularly in Western cultures; see Niu & Kaufman, 2013), increased mortality salience could lead people toward more social activity and less creative activity. Indeed, several studies (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Schimel, 1999; Routledge, Arndt, Vess, & Sheldon, 2008) have found exactly this phenomenon.

Obviously, a scarcity of grant opportunities does not equal the awareness of one’s eventual death. Yet the larger issue remains: When we feel the most vulnerable and aware of life’s limitations, we gravitate away from creativity. Given that people are most prone to show anti-creative views when primed to feel negatively about uncertainty (Mueller et al., 2012), such an extrapolation to granting agencies would not be a surprise.

Suppression of creativity is not a problem just in academia, but in any context. Business, art, music, science, law, medicine—all domains depend on creativity to move forward. When a society withdraws resources from creative endeavors, all enterprises potentially suffer.


A further problem today is restricted opportunities. Because of limited funding and changing patterns of instruction in higher education, more and more positions are off tenure track—adjuncts or similar positions. Today, roughly 70% of faculty positions are contingent—part-time, adjunct, or some other variety of non-tenure-track position (Edmonds, 2015). Such faculty members are rarely able to conduct research. And if they do, they have to be very careful because they are not eligible, in their positions, to receive tenure. If they antagonize the wrong people, they are potentially out of a job. Tenure was set up to protect academic freedom, and it still does, at least in most places (Sternberg, 2016). Faculty without tenure protection cannot well afford to defy the crowd, because to do so may cost them their livelihood.

One might wish that the situation with tenure-track faculty members would improve when the economy does. But that is in no way a foregone conclusion. Although adjunct faculty members generally do not improve the research reputation of a university, they do improve its finances. Quite simply, they are far more cost-effective than tenure-track faculty members (or, in many cases, graduate students), because institutions can pay them less to do more.

Universities today have entered into an international competition for talent, but often the competition focuses more on faculty members’ ability to generate funds than on their creativity.  Even in universities, which should be at the forefront of rewarding creativity, the reward system is skewed toward those who generate funds. The most creative English, music, or art professor is likely to be paid substantially less than a not particularly creative scientist or engineer, especially if the latter generates large numbers of dollars through indirect-cost recovery for the university. If universities do not set themselves up as role models for rewarding creativity, it’s not clear what institutions will.

There is no particular incentive for universities to increase benefits for adjuncts so that they would have more time, freedom, or security to enable them to be creative in their research and community activity. Indeed, Brennan and Magness (2016) estimated that for universities to offer reasonable benefits (which they called “justice”) for adjuncts would cost between $15 and $50 billion a year.


There has been a notable increase in the diffusion of ideas over the last twenty years because of the growing use and dominance of the internet. Such diffusion can help creativity because scholars can get their ideas disseminated to the world more easily. Indeed, Gangadharbatla (2010) argued that technology should be included as a fourth key component (in addition to person, domain, and field) to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1999) systems theory. But there is a downside as well to increased diffusion of ideas. In particular, the same mechanisms that diffuse creative ideas also diffuse the counter-ideas of the "crowd.” Because the creative person is one and the crowd is many, the opposition becomes much louder than a single person can be. In other words, it is true that the internet enables a researcher to better diffuse his or her ideas to many different people. Yet, conversely, there will be many more people who are members of the crowd and will have this same opportunity to diffuse their own ideas. This relatively new ability to reach countless people without a check or filter for the quality of one’s ideas allows people with unscientific (or outright insane) thoughts to reach the multitudes. A person with pseudoscientific or antiscientific ideas can reach just as many people as (and often more than) an actual researcher in the field. Ideas that are more creative are often harder to properly evaluate and can thus be underestimated (Licuanan, Dailey, & Mumford, 2007).

Being surrounded by a groupthink mentality encourages people to be creative only in a manner approved by the group—even when they are later working on their own (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Haslam, 2007). Being perceived as part of the in-group has a profound impact on how creative work is interpreted. Members of the in-group are considered to be more creative (Haslam, Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Jans, 2013), to the point where a conservative milieu could result in people preferring and choosing to listen to less creative ideas (Adarves-Yorno, Postmes, & Haslam, 2006). It is easy to imagine a scientist with creative, complex, and challenging ideas being out-shouted by clickbait-seeking blogs, media aimed at the lowest common denominator, or even rival scientists with opposing views and better presentation styles.

A caveat regarding diffusion of creative ideas is that the adoption of a creative idea can lead to lesser future creativity. People and societies both can become entrenched (Frensch & Sternberg, 1989). Once a paradigm is established—often by someone with great creativity—followers emerge who move the paradigm forward, but in ways that merely tinker around the edges (Kuhn, 2012; Sternberg, Kaufman, & Pretz, 2002). Similarly, the Apple iPhone was a very creative innovation, but has served as much to spawn imitators as to foment progress in the development of innovative kinds of cell phones.


Social media provides an increased opportunity for the exaggeration of ideas. The numerous platforms that exist to voice one’s ideas—from Facebook to Twitter to YouTube—allow people with extreme views to reach audiences that would have been nearly impossible to reach a decade ago. What we see through social media is group polarization (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969), or what is sometimes called risky shift. In groups, especially ones with homogeneous views, outcomes become exaggerated, and the groups often end up taking more extreme and exaggerated positions than would individuals. Such polarization can lead to groupthink and bad problem solving and decision making (Janis, 1972).

Social media has allowed groupthink to grow at an astounding rate without people even being aware of its happening. As trust in traditional news media declines, for example, people are more likely to believe a story shared on social media by a friend (Turcotte, York, Irving, Scholl, & Pingree, 2015). Further, people believe that their social-media friends share opinions and views at a much higher rate than they truly do (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010). Given people’s ability to hide, mute, unfollow, or block people with whose opinions they disagree, this discrepancy may continue to grow with time.

The impact is felt particularly deeply in science. When a scholar proposes a controversial idea, she or he needs to be cautious. The opposition, in contrast, may not feel the need to be cautious. For example, Williams and Ceci (2015) published an article asserting that faculty have a 2:1 preference for women in hiring for STEM university positions. The article set off a furor (e.g., Brownstein, 2015), with hundreds if not thousands of online critiques. Some of the essays written in reply were extremely acerbic in their language, and many of the attacks were personal. The point is not whether Williams and Ceci’s conclusions are right or wrong; the point is that with the invention of social media, one’s reputation can be ruined very quickly (Ronson, 2016).

Scholars may be at less risk of (but not exempt from) having a tweet or careless post doom their careers. But there are still many potential threats to one’s reputation on the internet. For example, consider the proliferation of websites and movements that track replicability, retractions, and potential mistakes in published articles. In general, such websites do an amazing amount of good and benefit science in countless ways. Nonetheless, there may be some unintended results. A flawed study that may have a statistical error or an unseen confounding variable that prevents replication should indeed be corrected—but the system often fails. Consider the case of Hanna Kokko, a biologist who conducted a follow-up study about sex roles in mate searching. She found results that contradicted her earlier study and submitted the new paper to the same journal, Evolution. The journal accepted the new paper, but also retracted the original paper against Kokko’s wishes (Chawla, 2016). Kokko did absolutely nothing wrong (and the website Retraction Watch was careful to provide a fair recap); with scientific progress comes the acknowledgement of past errors. Yet the journal treated the initial paper with the same tactics used for ethical breaches. Kokko’s retracted paper will exist forever in cyberspace, potentially stripped of the explanatory context that exonerates her from anything other than good scientific practice.

The exaggeration present in cyberspace may give anyone pause. But the potential for genuine career damage to a scientist is real. A controversial paper that raises hackles or an unusual finding that may not hold up to scrutiny can be an unexpected hurdle that leads to unwanted scrutiny. It would not be surprising if many young scientists recognize that it is far safer to conduct straightforward, incremental studies that fit existing paradigms and use established methods. Defying the crowd has costs (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). As there are more and more ways for the crowd to exaggerate their opposition to one’s ideas, these costs only increase.

Exaggeration also occurs elsewhere than social media. A sad example is among scientists who should know better and journals that should be more responsible in what they report. Media sometimes cover scientists’ work, but they are especially interested in work that reports novel and extremely surprising findings. Thus, tthere can be great pressure on scientists to produce very surprising findings. Sometimes the pressure is so great that scientists cross the line and end up exaggerating or even outright faking their data, as in the case of Diederik Stapel, who surprised people with extraordinary findings, but unfortunately ones based on invented data.


In this article, we have argued that a number of forces in contemporary society act jointly to erode creativity. The ERODE model has five elements: Education, Resources, Opportunities, Diffusion, and Exaggeration. In particular, education runs the risk of stifling student creativity because of the shackles of standardized testing. Limited resources tend to encourage conservatism in ideation and hesitation to take risks. Restricted opportunities for careers further diminish creativity, as scholars and other creative individuals become afraid to take positions that might result in losing their jobs (or not getting jobs in the first place). Diffusion of ideas should increase creativity, but this principle works both ways; the crowd is in a better position to drown out the creative individual. And finally, social media has resulted in many opportunities for exaggeration; creative individuals may see their work attacked or even reasonable critiques become distorted and misreported.

Of course, all of these forces could be mobilized by society to work in exactly the opposite direction from the way they now tend to work. In particular, education could and should encourage, nurture, and reward creative thinking (Beghetto et al., 2014; Sternberg, Jarvin, & Grigorenko, 2009). Resources, particularly from governmental granting agencies, could be expanded rather than contracted as they have been over a period of many years—or, if this seems too idealistic, some funds could be reserved for genuinely challenging and provocative work that has a higher risk of failure. Opportunities could increase if more universities were willing to open tenure-track positions rather than rely on cheaper, but ultimately less societally beneficial, adjunct positions; even increasing adjuncts’ benefits and job security would be a step in the right direction. Diffusion of ideas could and sometimes does lead to greater creativity, if naysayers are willing to reflect upon and perhaps endorse new ideas rather than quickly stifle them. Silicon Valley today perhaps is the best example of a work culture that diffuses ideas in a positive manner, encouraging start-ups and allowing for the failures of creative risk-taking. And exaggeration of opposition would be decreased if people were not so quick, on social media, to primarily read posts from those who agree with them and then to form crowds attacking new ideas (as evidenced by Williams & Ceci, 2015, and other similar cases). So there is hope, but society creates its own future. Will we choose the path that nurtures and supports creativity and innovation? Or will we ultimately continue to erode our greatest minds?


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Cite This Article as: Teachers College Record Volume 120 Number 5, 2018, p. 1-18
https://www.tcrecord.org ID Number: 22093, Date Accessed: 11/29/2020 8:20:04 PM

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About the Author
  • Robert Sternberg
    Cornell University
    ROBERT J. STERNBERG is Professor of Human Development at Cornell University. His primary interests are intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. He is the author of What Universities Can Be (Cornell University Press, 2016) and senior editor of Scientists Making a Difference: One Hundred Eminent Behavioral and Brain Scientists Talk About Their Most Important Contributions (Cambridge University Press, 2016). He is editor of Perspectives on Psychological Science, a member of the National Academy of Education, and past president of the American Psychological Association.
  • James Kaufman
    University of Connecticut
    E-mail Author
    JAMES C. KAUFMAN is Professor of Educational Psychology at the University of Connecticut. His primary interest is creativity; recent books include the second edition of Creativity 101 (Springer, 2016) and (with Ron Beghetto and John Baer) Creativity in the Common Core Classroom (Teachers College Press, 2014).
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