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The University of Utopiareviewed by Arthur G. Wirth - 1970 ![]() Author(s): Robert M. Hutchins Publisher: John Wiley, New York ISBN: , Pages: , Year: Search for book at Amazon.com One who has faith that man is in some degree rational, though in
greater degree animal, must believe that sooner or later the light
will shine through the murk. Robert M. Hutchins University of Utopia (1964, p. IX)Ours is a tortured time. In education, as in other aspects of
our lives, we hunger for a clear sense of direction, for a firm
knowledge of what ought to be done. Some thirty years ago the clear and insistent voice of Robert
M-Hutchins announced that the content of the true education was
available. If we would but recognize and adopt it, we would have a
rock upon which to build, no matter how fiercely the winds of
change and doubt might blow. His book, The Higher Learning In
America, was published first in the crisis-ridden Thirties and
then re-issued in paperback in the still troubled Sixties. In 1953
Mr. Hutchins delivered the Charles R. Walgreen Lectures published
under the title, The University of Utopia. Here he returned
to the subject of the hazards to education in the U.S.A. and the
methods for overcoming them. This, too, was re-issued in paperback
in the Sixties. In introductory remarks for the second editions the
author affirms his confidence in the correctness of each of his
earlier views. It would appear, then, that we have been presented
with an alternative to ill-tempered controversy or faddist
tinkering about where education is concerned. Robert Hutchins, in a
forthright fashion, tried in each instance to speak sense to us.
After careful reflection he decided to make available, once again
in this decade, the prescriptions which, if heeded, might
have helped us earlier. The case for reviewing such writings is obvious. With all of our
gropings, if a time-proven formula to end the chaos is available,
we would be remiss, indeed, in failing to seize hold of
it. There is the peculiar fact, however, that with the exception of
St. Johns College, one looks in vain in higher education, or at
lower levels, for acceptance of the Hutchins master plan. We may be
a nation of fools—misguided, intractable, so victimized by
our own mis-education that we cannot recognize the truth when it is
offered. There is another possibility: that a flaw lies in the
Philosopher's Stone itself. That will be the contention of this
paper. To be blunt, Mr. Hutchins falters on the point which he
argues is basic to attaining his primary
objective—defining the features of true education. His
thesis is that to get clear thinking about true education it is
indispensable to begin with clear philosophical presuppositions. In
the two books in question he takes conflicting and confused
positions on the philosophical question. He then adds to the
disarray, when the books are re-issued, by endorsing his earlier
statements as if they proceeded from the same assumptions when, in
fact, they do not. It becomes, then, a fair question to ask whether
Mr. Hutchins makes a contribution to light or
obscurity. We shall forego a review, in detail, of Mr. Hutchins' general
recommendations for education: the need for all children to
be taught the basic skills of language and mathematics as
indispensable for thinking; the case for a knowledge of the great
books of our intellectual heritage. Nor shall we make this
program the subject of argument. It would be hard to find an
educator who would take exception to the first, and this
writer is sympathetic to the need for judicious inclusion of the
latter, although the questions of when and for whom are a bit more
complex than Mr. Hutchins admits. We shall concentrate on a point at the center of his argument: a
return to true education is needed to combat the chaos of our time;
such education must be grounded in true philosophical first
principles. Hutchins' most widely quoted words sum it up,
"Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge.
Knowledge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. Hence
education should be everywhere the same" (The Higher Learning in
America, p. 66). The argument assumes the availability of an
unshakable truth. In a footnote to the famous quotation, Hutchins
cites St. Thomas to assure us, "It is therefore evident that,
as regards the general principles whether of speculative or
practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is
generally known by all." (Summa Theologica, Part II, Q. 94,
Art. 4.) Since the point is crucial, we need to know more about the
source of the precious truth teachers should teach. In the chapters
following the definition of true education we are led closer and
closer to the answer. Mr. Hutchins deplores the debasement of
higher education by an overemphasis on science and empirical
research, and by the teaching of practical skills in professional
schools. What, on the contrary, should be the major responsibility
of the university? Its basic function should be to pursue and
produce the true knowledge which is needed to unify the entire
educational system at all levels. It cannot be, however, the source
of unity and harmony unless its own house is in order. The
university lacks order in the twentieth century because there is no
ordering principle in it. Mr. Hutchins emphasizes that a present emphasis on the freedom
to pursue truth is not sufficient to deliver it. "In the
current use of freedom it is an end in itself. But it must be clear
that if each person has the right to make and achieve his own
choices the result is anarchy and the dissolution of the whole" (p.
94). The pursuit of truth for its own sake is also
unsatisfactory as a unifier of the higher learning. For Mr.
Hutchins reminds us, "Philistines still ask, what is truth?
And all truths cannot be equally important" (p. 95). More is
needed if the university is to be held together. "Real unity
can be achieved only by a hierarchy of truths which shows us which
are fundamental and which subsidiary, which significant and which
not." Clearly the way out of the dilemma can be found only if we have
access to truth of an abiding order, free of an imperfect,
tentative quality. Where may such Truth be found? Mr. Hutchins
mentions only two sources. The first is theology, which furnishes a
principle of unity to the Medieval University. The eloquence which
Hutchins brings to describing the role which theology performed
indicates it is the ideal instrument for producing the desired
hierarchy of truths: The medieval theologians had worked out an elaborate statement in due proportion and emphasis of the truths relating to man and God, man and man, and man and nature. It was an orderly progression from truth to truth. As man's relations to God were the highest of which he could conceive, as all his knowledge came from God and all his truths, the truths concerning God and man were those which gave meaning and sequence to his knowledge. Theology ordered the truths concerning man and man; humanism was theocentric; man loved his brothers in God. Theology ordered the truths of man and nature, for God created the world; he created man to live in it, and placed him in definite relation to other creatures. The insight that governed the system of the medieval theologians was that as first principles order all truths in the speculative order, so last ends order all means and actions in the practical order. God is the first truth and the last end. The medieval university was rationally ordered, and, for its time, it was practically ordered, too (p. 96). Beautiful as was this ordering, it unfortunately is not for us.
"We are a faithless generation and take no stock in revelation.
Theology implies orthodoxy and an orthodox church. We have neither.
To look to theology to unify the modern university is futile and
vain" (p. 97). So we are forced back to a condition like that of the Greeks who
lived before the institution of the One Church and the Queen of
Studies, Theology. The Greeks, however, had available the
well-ordered life. Greek thought was unified by the study of first
principles. Plato provided the method of dialectic for
exploring first principles and "Aristotle made the knowledge
of them into the science of metaphysics, rather than theology" (p.
97). Metaphysics, as the highest and universal science, unified
Greek thought as theology ordered thought in the Middle Ages. "It
considers being as being, both what it is and the attributes which
belong to it as being" (p. 98). Metaphysics is the source of
highest wisdom for wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes and
metaphysics deals with the highest of these. The knowledge of
metaphyics has the yearned for timeless quality, and to prove it
Hutchins quotes Aristotle to the effect that this knowledge must be
confined to God: For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science God alone can have or God above all others (p. 98). We learn with relief that metaphysics is divine in Aristotle's
sense that it is not beyond nature and reason and, furthermore, it
is diffused widely and "accessible to all who are capable of
virtue." We seem to be almost home when suddenly there is a fall
into the dark. The thought of modern times can be given order only by
either theology or metaphysics. Since our author has told us we
cannot appeal to theology, only metaphysics is left. Then the
crusher: metaphysics, like theology, Mr. Hutchins announces,
is almost totally missing. It has shrunken to an innocuous,
occasional course in "a department called philosophy" (p.
102). Here, we might well think that we had been brought to the end
of the story, albeit, with a sad and distressing ending. We have
heard a compelling argument that theology or metaphysics alone can
rescue us from the onrushing disorder, and have been told
that for all practical purposes neither exists. Mr. Hutchins, however, is not content to leave us stranded. He
gives examples of how, in fact, metaphysics creeps back on campus
as experts in the sciences or humanities, untrained in metaphysics,
persist in amateurish pronouncements on metaphysical
questions which compound confusion. Or, in the Communist World, we
have Marx, installed in the place of God, providing a false
metaphysics. But the Communists realize at least that "it is
impossible to have social order without intellectual order" (p.
105). Mr. Hutchins' point is that these abortive metaphysical
efforts do show "how much we feel the need of an orthodox
theology or a systematic metaphysics" (p. 104, italics
mine). We now are at a critical transition point. Hutchins is eager to
move on to announce the programmatic outlines of a well-ordered
university. But so far he has established only the
following: (1) That a well-ordered university• is impossible in the
absence of a unifying theology or metaphysics. (2) That no agreed-on systematic theology or metaphysics exists
in American Society. (3) That we (some at least) feel the need of an orthodox
theology or metaphysics. In order to show the shaky bridge Mr. Hutchins then constructs
to move from his philosophical analysis to what is needed to his
recommendations for educational content, we quote his words
directly but number the sentences so that the argument may be
followed closely. (1) I am not here arguing for any specific theological or
metaphysical system. (2) I am insisting that consciously or unconsciously we are
always trying to get one. (3) I suggest that we shall get a better one if we recognize
explicitly the need for one and try to get the most rational
one we can. Then he adds, We are, as a matter of fact, living today by the haphazard, accidental, shifting shreds of a theology and metaphysics to which we cling because we must cling to something. Here we note that a shift has occurred from the earlier argument
that chaos can be banished only if actual metaphysical unity
is provided to the position that we feel a need for
unity. Then, (4) If we can revitalize metaphysics and restore it to
its place in the higher learning, we may be able to establish
rational order in the modern world as well as in the universities
(p. 105, italics mine). Mr. Hutchins is now ready to lead us to the campus to show us
the designs of true education in a true university. We cannot but
recall the force of his contention that the task of education
is to teach the truth. To teach truth, the truth must be known. The
indispensable condition is the existence of a metaphysics to
provide the first principles on which a hierarchy of
well-ordered truths must rest. Then there was the shocking
statement that such a metaphysics does not exist. As the
educational tour begins, however, Mr. Hutchins provides an opening
question to reassure us, and to get us under way, "If this
miracle [of restoring metaphysics] could be performed, what would
the content of the higher learning be and what would a university
be like?" (pp. 105-106, italics mine). As we move off, we seem to
hear from a window of the Administration building the lovely lyrics
of "Wishing Will Make It So" from the classic story of Cinderella,
and our guide announces: The Student beginning with the junior year would study metaphysics, the science of first principles. He would study the social sciences, which are practical sciences, dealing with the relations of man and man. He would study natural science which is the science of man and nature (p. 106). Such a course of study would be free from the disordered quality
marking schedules based-on the elective scheme. It would proceed
from an intelligible, rational structure with metaphysics providing
the first order principles. Subordinate to it in the hierarchy
would be the natural and social sciences. By way of illustration,
Hutchins provides us with an explanation of what should be the
proper relation of natural sciences to metaphysics. The natural
sciences get their basic principles from the philosophy of
nature, a branch of metaphysics. "In the study of [the
natural sciences] such recent observations as serve to
illustrate, exemplify, or confirm these principles
must be included" (p. 108, italics mine). It is too bad that the
tour does not provide time for an answer to the question of what
would happen if an observation does not confirm a metaphysically
derived basic principle. Mr. Hutchins gives us many more details about how the true
university would be organized if the elusive metaphysics
could be attained in fact. Many have agreed that it is an
impressive tale. In the early Fifties, while we were caught in the miseries of
the Korean War and the McCarthy episode, Mr. Hutchins addressed
himself again to the question of the hazards facing education. In
The University of Utopia, Hutchins acts as spokesman
for a mythical Utopia, which starts with problems like those of our
own U.S.A. Instead of being mired in controversy, though, the
Utopians are able to create a rational educational program which
leads to a genuinely enlightened community. The four principal
dangers to be confronted are: those associated with industrialism
(which include a variety of consequences flowing from science
and technology), specialization, philosophical diversity, and
social and political conformism. We shall consider only the matter
of philosophical diversity. The people of Utopia desire a community
guided by wisdom. Diversity is a threat, for in a general sense the
problem is whether a community is possible in a condition where
thinking men can't think together because they can't communicate.
Specialization may make their languages and interests
so divergent that they can't come together. Philosophical
diversity may mean that their differences over basic principles
or assumptions are so important that their conversations move along
different lines. A resolution of the problem is critical both
for the sake of community unity and educational reform. If this
sounds familiar we are not surprised, for we know that the
spokesman for Utopia is the same as the author of The Higher
Learning In America. Since the basic problem in the two works is defined in identical
terms, we may recall Hutchins' earlier solution: the sole way to
end confusion was to locate an instrument which could assure
intellectual unity at the level of first principles. Only a
theology or a metaphysics could perform the task. It is
striking, then, to find that the guide to Utopia in 1953 employs
neither the term theology nor metaphysics. This may be nothing
more, however, than a matter of semantics, because it is still to
philosophy, as a concern with first principles (here, again, never
precisely defined), to which Mr. Hutchins turns for the key to
attaining unity. Hutchins makes clear, however, that he does not
look to contemporary philosophy without apprehension. The
Departments of Philosophy seem to offer little hope. In their
efforts to ape science, academic philosophers have become
highly technical, with non-humanistic or even anti-humanistic
tendencies. They tend to write on esoteric subjects of interest
only to fellow academicians. They speak, moreover, with many voices
as illustrated by their schools of positivism, pragmatism and
Marxism each of which Hutchins finds wanting. Yet a civilized
community must know what is its problem. "Civilization is the deliberate pursuit of a common ideal.
Education is the deliberate attempt to produce the type of man it
wants (The University of Utopia, p. 52). To have a
philosophy of education we must have "a rational conception of man
and society" in a contemporary condition where "there is no
authority that can decide among competing philosophies" (p.
54). Does Mr. Hutchins confront this situation of chaos with the
despair we saw in his earlier essays? No. It is hard to feel that
he enjoys the situation but we are told there is a way to get on.
This time the candidate to provide leadership to dispel confusion
turns out to be a hitherto little-honored newcomer—philosophy
of education. It evidently is capable of providing unity in a
quite remarkable way. The University of Utopia, for example, has
been able to develop a philosophy of education. "It has been
able to do this in spite of the fact that in Utopia there is
philosophical diversity. The Utopians even insist that
philosophical diversity is a good thing" (p. 54). A point which
helps is that the Utopians are sensible people who believe that
education "is a conversation aimed at truth" (p. 56). (One may note
that they seem to differ from earlier followers of Hutchins who
insisted on the importance of access to truth itself. They held
that freedom merely to pursue truth was quite insufficient.
Remember the Philistines!) The question, nevertheless, remains how
the Utopian philosophers of education can produce "one educational
system and one educational philosophy in the face of philosophical
diversity" (p. 67). We shall try to follow this point in a
moment. First, we note that as far as the educational program for
young Utopians is concerned, it is essentially the same as that
recommended by the younger Hutchins in previous years: an early
emphasis, for the first ten years, on teaching the communication
skills necessary to take part in the conversation aimed at truth.
Reading, writing, and figuring are supplemented by history,
geography and the world's great literature. At age sixteen, for
four years, emphasis shifts from learning techniques of
communication to studying the leading ideas about man and
the world that have animated mankind. Following this, the young
adult may enter the world of work or further study at the
University. All citizens of Utopia will be students, from time to
time, throughout their lives in centers of education for
adults. This program, when originally advocated by Mr. Hutchins, was
predicted on the future realization of an if condition.
If a unifying metaphysics could be revived or created, a
rational, unified program of education could be deduced from it.
Have the philosophers of Utopia succeeded in creating such a
unifying metaphysics? As mentioned previously, Mr. Hutchins, as
Utopian spokesman, does not now use the term metaphysics
which was of such crucial importance before. He does assure
us that Utopians have succeeded in creating one educational
philosophy which provides the underpinnings for a single
educational program. How has this feat been accomplished? By making the consideration of philosophical diversity
the primary concern of educational philosophy. . . . The University
is not a center of propaganda for an official doctrine. ... It is
concerned with all doctrines that can have any reasonable claim to
be taken seriously. Its effort is toward a definition of the real
points of agreement and disagreement among these doctrines, not in
the hope of obtaining unanimity, but in the hope of attaining
clarity. The object is not agreement but communication. The
Utopians think it would be very boring to agree with one another
(p. 67). There is, however, the remarkable result that does, in fact,
happen in Utopia. Having agreed not to agree, but to communicate
areas of agreement and disagreement, Utopian philosophers of
education succeed in producing a single philosophy of education and
a single educational program. Unfortunately, Mr. Hutchins leaves
out the details as to how this transformation takes place. It would
be fascinating to discover, for example, how a thorough
discussion of the educational ideas of Plato, Dewey,
Maritain, Rousseau, Skinner, Barzun and A. S. Neill would lead to a
single set of agreements about education. Perhaps such
amalgams are possible only for Utopians, not mere mortals. It would
be nice if we were told so. Fewer would be left wondering why such
sound ideas are not adopted more widely.
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