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Expulsion Litigation and the Limits of In Loco Parentis, 1860-1960


by Scott Gelber - 2014

Background/Context: Legal scholars often contrast the litigiousness of contemporary American higher education with a bygone era characterized by near-absolute respect for academic authority. According to this account, a doctrine of “academic deference” insulated colleges until the 1960s, when campus protests and new federal regulations dramatically heightened the intensity of legal oversight. This study tests that conventional wisdom, and its underlying assumption about the origins of student rights, by analyzing expulsion suits during the 100 years before 1960.

Purpose: Faculty and administrators tend to question if external legal pressure can play a constructive role in debates about higher education. This predisposition tempts us to invoke an earlier era of in loco parentis in order to portray institutional autonomy as a time-honored source of academic achievement. By highlighting overlooked state statutes (especially regarding public institutions) and contractual obligations (especially regarding private institutions), this study examines whether the power to discipline students in loco parentis actually triumphed prior to the 1960s.

Research Design: The study presents a historical analysis of the 44 college expulsion cases that were reported between 1860 and 1960. Examination of reported decisions was supplemented by archival research regarding landmark cases.

Conclusions/Recommendations: This study concludes that courts regularly reinstated expelled students during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These cases indicate that the power to act in loco parentis was limited by a countervailing tradition that emphasized college access and compelled institutions to provide due process prior to dismissal. This early strain of decisions laid the groundwork for the more expansive view of student rights that emerged during the 20th century. This finding encourages faculty and administrators to recognize the legal traditions and student dissenters that helped to enshrine accessibility as a defining feature of American higher education.



Legal scholars routinely contrast the litigiousness of contemporary American higher education with a bygone era characterized by near-absolute respect for academic authority. According to this account, an informal doctrine of “academic deference” discouraged courts from ruling against colleges unless confronted with indisputable evidence of arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory policies. Not only did judges often grant colleges the same privileges as other charitable or governmental organizations, but they also appeared to regard institutions of higher education as rarefied entities that should operate above the political fray. Indeed, colleges prevailed in the vast majority of lawsuits related to property transactions, employment, and personal injury. When students challenged admission or expulsion decisions, this immunity could be bolstered by two additional principles: the notion that higher education was a privilege rather than a right and the belief that faculty acted in loco parentis to protect the minors under their supervision. Scholars typically conclude that these rationales insulated institutions of higher education until the 1960s, when campus protests and federal regulations encouraged a flood of litigation and dramatically increased the legal exposure of colleges and universities (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Gajda, 2009; Kaplin & Lee, 2006).


Yet closer examination reveals that courts routinely intervened to promote college access well before the 1960s. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, courts ruled against colleges in almost half of reported admission, expulsion, or tuition cases.1 Although this willingness to entertain student suits can seem unexpected, the fragility of academic deference becomes less surprising when viewed in historical context. First, most 19th-century colleges struggled for respect (and often for survival) while striving to establish a clear dividing line between “higher” and “lower” education. Colleges typically enrolled large numbers of underprepared students on campuses that could be difficult to distinguish from preparatory academies (Geiger, 1998; Ogren, 2005). In addition, collegiate authority was undermined by the political and legal environment of the 19th century. Politically, the Populist impulse (especially in southern and western states) encouraged suspicions of academic expertise (Gelber, 2011). Legally, the fundamental rationale for the common law system—the belief that local judges were best positioned to understand local conventions—encouraged courts to interpret student suits in light of colleges’ customary obligations to their students.2 Because colleges were expected to prioritize access, 19th-century courts ruled in favor of students almost as often as they deferred to academic authority.


Focusing on expulsion cases, in particular, this article argues that the power to act in loco parentis was far more limited than has been typically assumed. A countervailing legal tradition promoted college access and mandated due process in the event of expulsion. The first section of this article focuses on public universities, which could be compelled to reinstate students on the basis of state statutes or constitutional provisions. The second section examines private colleges, which could be compelled to reinstate students on the basis of contract law. A final section complicates the apparent triumph of academic deference in the middle of the 20th century by noting the persistence of judicial expectations regarding due process even within cases ruled in favor of institutions. Ultimately, these pro-student strains of expulsion law would serve as precedents for the expansive view of student rights that prevailed during the 1960s. This reinterpretation indicates that the jurisprudence of expulsion evolved out of longstanding and substantive debates over the nature of higher education rather than habitual deference to academic authority.


PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE RIGHT TO ENROLLMENT


College presidents and professors have complained about impious, rebellious, and anti-intellectual behavior since the colonial era. These conflicts between students and faculty expectations intensified during the 19th century, when the center of extracurricular life shifted from the literary society to the fraternity house and the football stadium. Students often avoided serious academic commitments and denigrated studious classmates. Some colleges, especially those closely affiliated with religious denominations, imposed strict codes of discipline. More commonly, faculty and administrators loosely enforced rules prohibiting sins such as drinking or gambling as long as students acted decorously within campus buildings. The emergence of the modern university, with its emphasis on scholarly production and graduate education, further eroded the parental authority of the college president and encouraged administrators to devote less attention to student life (Horowitz, 1987; Rudolph, 1962).

Nevertheless, faculty still resorted to expulsion when confronted with serious offenses, and dismissed students sometimes challenged these actions in court. Presiding judges were compelled to determine whether higher education more closely approximated a right (granted as a matter of course and protected by judicial oversight) or a privilege (granted according to the discretion of college authorities). Between 1860 and 1910, American courts were divided on this subject—judges saw fit to intervene on behalf of students in roughly half of reported expulsion cases (9/21). Perhaps surprisingly, courts were more likely to side with students in cases concerning academic performance as opposed to disciplinary infractions (see the appendix). More predictably, courts were particularly inclined to overrule the expulsion of students from public universities. Courts reversed expulsions from these institutions in two thirds (5/7) of reported cases before 1910.


Of course, it is somewhat crude to draw broader conclusions about judicial perceptions of American higher education based on a tally of cases “won” or “lost” by students. Judges are supposed to frame their decisions according to constitutions, statutes, and precedents rather than according to their sympathies for the arguments presented by plaintiffs or defendants (White, 1971). However, whereas some expulsion rulings hinged on technicalities or indisputable readings of established law, most cases required interpretation of debatable questions of educational policy. These deliberations were necessary because statutory and constitutional language related to colleges tended to be imprecise (Byrne, 1989). As a result, student expulsion suits often required courts to decide for themselves whether public higher education should be considered akin to a privilege or a right.


Before 1910, the most prominent ruling on this subject was an Indiana Supreme Court case that leaned dramatically in favor of student rights. State ex rel. Stallard v. White (1882) stemmed from a ban on fraternity membership at Purdue University, the state’s land grant institution. When a student challenged this policy, the university responded that students did not possess an absolute legal right to enrollment (Wallace, n.d.). Citing the tradition of in loco parentis, a circuit court initially sided with Purdue and refused “to set limits to the inherent and necessary powers of teachers” (Vinton, n.d., p. 2). However, the state’s high court overturned this ruling after concluding that Indiana law obligated the public university to educate “every inhabitant of this state, of suitable age, and of reasonably good moral character, not afflicted with any contagious or loathsome disease, and not incapacitated by some mental or physical infirmity” (State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 1882).


Although Stallard was technically an admissions suit, its strong declaration of student “rights” (the opinion used the word five times) influenced subsequent expulsion rulings. To a certain extent, the case merely affirmed the traditional accessibility of 19th-century colleges. Indeed, as a matter of both policy and law, boosting enrollment was a priority of 19th-century higher education. A lack of adequate and affordable secondary schooling meant that few college applicants possessed substantial levels of preparation. Most colleges responded by enrolling virtually every student. Even so, state legislatures perceived a need to restrain the admissions authority of public colleges and universities. Although extremely lax compared with current standards, 19th-century entrance requirements created tensions between rural residents who had almost no access to secondary education and college faculty who hoped to end remedial courses sooner rather than later. Influenced no doubt by legislators’ interest in providing benefits to their districts, 19th-century statutes often directed public universities to admit students from all regions of a state even if they possessed minimal qualifications (Douglass, 2007; VanOverbeke, 2008; Wechsler, 1977).


Conscious of this spirit, a number of judges invoked Stallard when ruling in favor of students who had been expelled because of academic inadequacy. In Brown v. Board of Education (1899), an Ohio court ruled that students were entitled to remain in a state college as long as they complied with behavioral expectations. According to the court, “there is no right more sacred than the right to admission to the public schools of the state.” The Supreme Courts of Nebraska and California agreed that enrollment in a public college was a routine administrative act rather than a matter of institutional discretion (Jackson v. State ex rel. Majors, 1898; Miller v. Dailey, 1902). In other words, enrollment was akin to the process of registering a car—a job for officials with rubber stamps, not an arena in which college presidents or faculty could exercise quasi-parental or quasi-judicial authority.


Whereas these three rulings involved less prestigious normal colleges, their bureaucratic vision of enrollment also figured prominently in Gleason v. University of Minnesota (1908), a case that compelled a flagship university to reinstate an expelled student. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that qualified students enjoyed a right to enroll at the state university as long as they abided by all published rules. The case derived from protests against the establishment of a faculty committee with broad authority to monitor collegiate athletics. Led by a law student named John L. Gleason, students attempted to regain full control of campus sports. When Gleason went to register for courses in the fall of 1907, he was notified that the board of trustees had expelled him on the grounds of academic deficiency and “certain insubordinate acts” (University of Minnesota Archives, n.d.). Citing Stallard, Gleason’s attorney argued that it was illegal to expel students for disciplinary reasons without providing a hearing, and illegal to expel students on any academic grounds whatsoever (Relator’s Brief, 1908). The university’s attorneys responded with the typical assertion that the trustees were entitled to a certain amount of deference because they were “men of character, fitness, and responsibility” (Brief of Appellants, 1908).


Unmoved by this claim, the court mandated Gleason’s reinstatement and declared that the university had never expelled students without a hearing in which the defendant was found to be “in all respects unworthy to be retained.” In language reminiscent of Stallard, the court concluded that the university’s founding legislation required the enrollment of “any and every inhabitant of the state if suitable age and reasonably good moral character, not afflicted with any contagious or loathsome diseases, and not incapable by any mental or physical infirmity” (Alternative Writ of Mandamus, 1908). Otherwise, students had “a prima facie” case to remain enrolled (Gleason v. University of Minnesota, 1908).


Strikingly, attorneys working on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) invoked this perspective on college access by citing both Stallard (1882) and Gleason (1908) during the early stages of the legal assault on segregated higher education. While presenting their arguments for the NAACP’s first successful desegregation suits (against the University of Maryland and the University of Missouri), Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall referred to these cases to establish that qualified students were entitled to enroll at public universities (Appellee’s Brief, 1935; Petition for Certiorari, 1938).


PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS


In contrast to public higher education cases, which tended to grapple with state statutes or constitutions, the majority of early expulsion suits targeted private colleges and involved dueling interpretations of contract law. This tendency distinguishes early expulsion cases from contemporary suits related to in loco parentis, which typically focus on personal injury claims (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Lane, 1933). Before 1910, judges regularly determined that college–student interactions constituted a contractual relationship that obligated institutions to provide some degree of due process prior to expulsion.


Scholars may have overlooked the prevalence of this contractual relationship because the oldest reported expulsion case seemed to define private higher education as a privilege offered at the discretion of the college. This case, styled People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College (1866), articulated the classic argument for the parental authority of college faculty and administrators.3 Since being established by Wesleyans in 1853, Wheaton College had assured prospective families that students were protected by close paternal supervision. The college also enforced a special ban on membership in secret societies, which its president believed to be unchristian as well as undemocratic. In 1866, a student who had been expelled for joining the Good Templars challenged the legality of this policy (Bechtel, 1984). Even though the Templars was a temperance organization that was compatible with Wheaton’s evangelical culture, the Illinois Supreme Court endorsed the college’s power to prohibit societies that threatened to rival its disciplinary power. The ruling also assured colleges that they could limit rights that students would otherwise enjoy as citizens. In what would become an archetypal statement of the power to govern students in loco parentis, the court concluded that it had “no more authority to interfere than [it had] to control the domestic discipline of a father in his family” (People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 1866).


This doctrine had deep roots, stretching back to the English tradition of authorizing private tutors to employ corporal punishment. American judges transplanted this principle by ruling that teachers enjoyed broad powers over their students and, like parents, did not need to publish rules or conduct hearings prior to administering discipline (Bickel & Lake, 1999; M. Levine, 1963). The Pratt ruling seemed to establish absolute collegiate authority over disciplinary expulsions. Other early cases communicated a similar message regarding academic expulsions at private institutions (Addy v. Western Pennsylvania Medical College, 1902; People v. New York Homeopathic Medical College, 1892).


Yet Pratt has come to serve as an exaggerated symbol of the prevalence of in loco parentis—a concept that rarely appeared in expulsion cases until after 1910. In contrast, a 19th-century ruling that reinstated a Dickinson College student has been underappreciated (Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 1887). Like most colleges, Dickinson was divided between students who honored official expectations and those who defined themselves in opposition to adult culture. This latter sort of student indicated their contempt for the “old fogies” who ran the institution by disrupting chapel ceremonies and ringing the college bell at inappropriate times (Contributed, 1886, p. 14). In the fall of 1886, students hazed a freshman after he attended a recitation even though pranksters had disabled the bell, which ordinarily signaled the start of classes. Afterward, President James A. McCauley suspended eight students and convened the faculty in order to gather evidence about hazing at the college. Indignant students howled outside the president’s office and threw rocks until a window shattered. One professor identified sophomore John Martz Hill fleeing the scene. Hill denied throwing a stone but was nevertheless expelled because he squirmed during interrogation (Dickinson College Archives, 1886; “Rumor and Fact,” 1886; “The Hill Case,” 1887).


The judge who ruled in favor of Hill struck a populist note by declaring that he paid especially close attention to the suit because the courts should remain forever “open to the meanest and humblest.” The judge also responded directly to the Pratt ruling by declaring that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not justify the suspension of students’ ordinary legal rights. Instead, the judge considered higher education cases to be no different from pedestrian suits regarding breach of contact, property rights, or personal injury. The opinion cited many common school cases, implying that institutions of higher education did not deserve special deference. Ultimately, the opinion stated that students were entitled to some form of trial (Hill had merely been summoned by the faculty and asked to make a statement), including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses (Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 1887).


Hill’s reference to contractual disputes foreshadowed the importance of contract law in other early expulsion cases. In part due to the rising average age of students during the late 19th century, the essence of the student–college relationship sometimes seemed more contractual than parental. To some extent, deference to the parental powers of college authorities still influenced interpretation of these informal contracts. Courts sometimes placed the burden of proof entirely on students or even empowered colleges to resolve their own disputes (Rabban, 1973).


Yet contract law could also bolster the claims of private college students in this era. For example, the New York Supreme Court ruled that a college’s circular had the force of a contract guaranteeing diplomas to students who satisfied the published requirements (People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hospital Medical College, 1891). At the time, progressive legal scholars also advocated for judicial intervention if contractual terms seemed blatantly unfair to a weaker party or contrary to the public good (Jackson, 1991). This strain of contract law meant that colleges could not assume that catalog language would insulate them against litigation. Even though a university’s catalog prohibited late payments and part-time course loads, the Maryland Court of Appeals signaled its sympathy with this progressive interpretation by suggesting that it had read the rules in light of the school’s historic mission—in this case, the institution had catered to nontraditional students and offered night classes (University of Baltimore v. Colton, 1904).


Even when courts ruled in favor of colleges, they often indicated that these institutions were contractually obligated to provide some form of due process prior to expulsion. An Ohio court rejected an expulsion suit against Case Western Reserve University in part because the school had conducted thorough disciplinary proceedings and acted with “prudence and discretion.” Although colleges did not need to provide formal criminal trials, their contractual relationships with students obligated officials to approach disciplinary matters in a deliberate and impartial manner. The court instructed colleges to examine available evidence, consider the possible bias of sources, and reach a judgment “as jurors with calmness, consideration and fair minds” (Koblitz v. Western Reserve, 1901). A New York court communicated a similar expectation while also ruling against an expelled student. The court stated that New York University fulfilled its obligations by gathering testimony from multiple witnesses and inviting the student to address a faculty meeting (Goldstein v. New York University, 1902). Altogether, these expulsion cases imply that the doctrine of academic deference competed with a set of counterbalancing principles grounded in a mixture of contract law and basic expectations of fair treatment.


THE (APPARENT) RISE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS


In terms of victories and defeats, 1910 marked a major inflexion point in the history of expulsion law. Beforehand, courts regularly intervened on behalf of students. Afterward, appellate courts upheld the actions of college officials in every reported expulsion case until 1961 (see appendix).


Although not technically an expulsion suit, the case of Gott v. Berea College (1913) heralded this transition to greater respect for administrative discretion. Gott authorized Berea College to ban students from patronizing off campus restaurants on the grounds that the college catered to “inexperienced” rural students who required protection against the temptations of village life. Citing Pratt v. Wheaton College (1866), the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that Berea was responsible for the welfare of its students and could, therefore, enforce any rule that a parent might adopt.


Two years after this decision, the United States Supreme Court bolstered academic autonomy in its first-ever college access case (Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 1915). The circumstances of the suit, which challenged a fraternity ban at the University of Mississippi, resembled State ex rel. Stallard v. White (1882). Yet in a direct repudiation of Stallard, the Supreme Court determined that enrollment in a state college was a privilege. The justices agreed with Mississippi’s high court, which had proclaimed that “the right to attend the educational institutions of the state is not a natural right” (Board of Trustees v. Waugh, 1913). This decision put the Supreme Court’s imprimatur on a “right-privilege distinction” that limited students’ legal protections for decades to come (Van Alstyne, 1968). Afterward, students who sued for college access could no longer expect judges to be moved by general statements about the purposes and obligations of public higher education.


The string of institutional victories in wake of Gott and Waugh reflected the rising influence of American colleges and universities— institutions whose status had benefited from larger enrollments, closer cooperation with government, and the advocacy of an increasingly professionalized faculty (Geiger, 1986). The size and stratification of higher education also rendered the field substantial enough and complex enough to merit this sort of deference (D. O. Levine, 1986). Meanwhile, American jurisprudence began to emphasize individual rights rather than traditional common law obligations (Balogh, 2009; Novak, 2002). While this shift protected students under the auspices of specific constitutional rights, it effectively ended the earlier practice of preserving college access by citing customary practices and purposes. Although the political and legal culture of progressivism encouraged judicial intervention on behalf of student underdogs, that reform movement ultimately did more to increase the authority of universities by encouraging the delegation of governmental powers to administrative agencies and quasi-public associations, including institutions of higher education (Loss, 2011).


On university campuses that were growing more complex and employing more highly trained professionals, this progressive faith in administrative expertise discouraged courts from overruling the judgments of faculty and administrators during the first half of the 20th century. Oliver Harker (1911), dean of the University of Illinois College of Law, warned judges that they would suffer “embarrassment” if they failed to respect faculty decisions. Rulings that rejected suits by students who had been dismissed for academic failure revealed a particularly clear increase in the autonomy of state colleges and universities (Foley v. Benedict, 1932; Pacella v. Bennett, 1917). These decisions were consistent with a progressive campaign to increase the efficiency of public higher education by elevating the status of flagship institutions and redirecting unprepared students to regional affiliates (D. O. Levine, 1986).


Although this increase in institutional authority did not apply with quite the same force to suits filed by students dismissed because of misconduct, courts also exhibited greater deference to colleges in these cases (Rabban, 1973). As Christopher Loss (2014) demonstrates in the next article in this special section, colleges were able to make more credible arguments for authority over student behavior because of a rebirth of administrative attention to student life during the 1920s and 1930s. Previously, the principle of in loco parentis had been invoked by colleges seeking immunity from lawsuits but was rarely interpreted as the source of any particular reciprocal duties with regard to student well-being (Bickel & Lake, 1999; “Private Government on the Campus,” 1963). This expansion of student services may have encouraged increasing respect for the legal authority of universities to act in place of parents.


Nevertheless, students and administrators continued to clash inside and outside courtrooms during the middle decades of the 20th century. Although colleges won all reported expulsion cases in this era, judges rarely suggested that the doctrine of in loco parentis provided iron-clad protection. The opinions in these cases often indicated that courts expected colleges to provide substantial disciplinary hearings or semiformal investigations before expulsion. For example, the Supreme Court of Montana endorsed the expulsion of a student but suggested that it might overturn an expulsion if a college prevented students from presenting their case or refused to provide proof of misconduct (Ingersoll v. Clapp, 1927). Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against a student, but only after determining that the school’s disciplinary process “did not by any act or word seek to limit her opportunity of explanation or justification of her conduct” (White v. Portia Law School, 1931).


These expectations intensified during the 1940s and 1950s. The National Student Association, an umbrella group for student government organizations, asked colleges to honor a student “bill of rights” promising that the “contractual . . . obligations and responsibilities” of students and colleges would be communicated in “clear and concise” language (Constitution of the United States National Student Association, 2006). Although the significance of these demands was mostly symbolic, new state laws indicated that college administrators could not assume that courts would naturally defer to their treatment of rebellious students. Indicative of ongoing questions about the amount of authority vested in administrators, California legislators felt compelled to specify that junior colleges could expel students for “willful disobedience,” “defiance of the authority of the teacher,” or “habitual profanity or vulgarity” (Statutes of California, 1947). In Louisiana, a statute that authorized the expulsion of students who engaged in “subversive” activities granted the right to a hearing with representation by council and the power to cross-examine witnesses (Acts of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, 1950). By 1957, Harvard Law School Professor Warren Seavey believed that the nation was overdue to grant all college students at least the same level of legal protection that was guaranteed to pickpockets.


CONCLUSION


Four years later, the landmark federal ruling of Dixon v. Alabama (1961) cited Seavey’s remarks. Dixon invalidated the summary expulsion of nine student activists from Alabama State College. In the process, the ruling reinforced the principles outlined in a strain of earlier expulsion cases by anchoring student rights to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Never again could colleges claim that their quasi-parental power entitled administrators to expel students without formal charges and a hearing.


Rather than an unprecedented transition away from the authority to act in loco parentis, the Dixon ruling represented the culmination of a longstanding debate over the student–college relationship. The opinion explicitly endorsed the expansive definition of student rights articulated by Hill (1887), affirmed by Gleason (1908), and sustained in the dicta of cases endorsing some sort of due process for expelled students throughout the first half of the 20th century. As indicated by Philip Lee (2014) in the third article in this special section, the racial politics underlying the case help to explain why the college failed to provide the modicum of due process that had been recommended in many earlier rulings. To a certain extent, Dixon passed judgment on a unilateral approach to discipline that was outside the mainstream of both American higher education and American jurisprudence. Although courts exhibited a substantial degree of respect for academic authority, this deference and the logic of in loco parentis was routinely counterbalanced by interpretations of state statutes and contract law.


Understandably, faculty and administrators tend to share a “dread of legal responsibility” (Bickel & Lake, 1999, p. 18). This orientation tempts us to invoke a mythical era of judicial deference in order to present institutional autonomy as a time-honored source of the nation’s academic achievements. Yet the development of expulsion law suggests that the celebrated accessibility of American higher education also owes something to the assertiveness of courts and students. By complicating the history of academic deference, the substance of early expulsion cases encourages serious consideration of the dissenting views that have helped to define the responsibilities and purposes of American colleges and universities.


Notes


1. Most cases “reported” in state publications were litigated at the appellate level. Today, these reports are compiled by the Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw databases. See the appendix for a list of reported expulsion cases between 1860 and 1960. These suits, including admissions and tuition cases, are examined with greater detail in my forthcoming book, Courtrooms and Classrooms: A Legal History of College Access, 1860-1960 (Johns Hopkins University Press).

2. Regarding this rationale for common law, see Parker (2011).

3. Gajda (2009), for example, employed Pratt as a representative 19th-century case before proceeding to the 20th century.


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VanOverbeke, M.A. (2008). The standardization of American schooling: Linking secondary and higher education, 1870-1910. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.


Vinton, D. P. (n.d.) The anti-fraternity rule of Purdue University declared legal and valid. Indiana ex rel., Samuel T. Stallard v. Emerson E. White (Indiana Circuit Court), Indiana State Archives.


Wallace, W. D. (n.d.). Closing argument for the faculty. Indiana ex rel., Samuel T. Stallard v. Emerson E. White (Indiana Circuit Court), Indiana State Archives.


Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).


Wechsler, H. S. (1977). The qualified student: A history of selective college admission in America. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.


White, G. E. (1971). The appellate opinion as historical source material, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 1, 491–509.


White v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass. 162 (1931).


APPENDIX: Reported College Expulsion Cases, 1860–1960


Univ = ruling for university or college; Stud = ruling for student

Pub/Priv = public or private status of the institution

Acad/Disc = academic or disciplinary case


Univ/Stud

Pub/Priv

Acad/Disc


Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Comm. v. McCauley, 2 Pa.C.C. 459 (1887)

Stud

Priv

Disc


State v. Osborne, 32 Mo. App. 536 (1888)

Stud

Pub

Disc


North v. Univ of IL, 137 Ill. 296 (1891)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Cecil v. Bellevue College, 14 N.Y.S. 490 (1891)

Stud

Priv

N/A


Jones v. NY Med. College, 20 N.Y.S. 379 (1892)

Univ

Priv

Disc


O’Sullivan v. NY Law Sch., 22 N.Y.S. 663 (1893)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Jackson v. Majors, 57 Neb. 183 (1898)

Stud

Pub

Acad


Brown v. Cleveland, 8 Ohio Dec. 378 (1899)

Stud

Pub

 

Acad


Niles v. Orange, 63 N.J.L. 528 (1899)

Univ

Priv

Acad


Koblitz v. W. Reserve, 11 Ohio C.D. 515 (1901)

Univ

Priv

     

Disc


Miller v. Dailey, 136 Cal. 212 (1902)

Stud

Pub

Acad


Steinhauer v. Arkins, 18 Colo. App. 49 (1902)

Univ

Pub

Acad


Goldstein v. NYU, 78 N.Y.S. 739 (1902)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Addy v. W. PA Med College, 11 Pa. D. 687 (1902)

Univ

Priv

Acad


Baltimore Univ v. Colton, 8 Md. 623 (1904)

Stud

Priv

N/A


Gannon v. Georgetown, 28 App. D.C. 87 (1906)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Burg v. Milw. Med College, 128 Wis. 7 (1906)

Univ

Priv

Acad


Gleason v. UM, 104 Minn. 359 (1908)

Stud

Pub

Both


Nelson v. Lincoln Medical, 81 Neb. 533 (1908)

Stud

Priv

Acad


Booker v. GR Med College, 156 Mich 95 (1909)

Univ

Priv

N/A


Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619 (1913)

Univ

Pub

N/A


Tate v. North Pacific College, 70 Or. 160 (1914)

Univ

Priv

Acad


Pacella v. Bennett, 205 Ill. App. 324 (1917)

Univ

Priv

Acad


Samson v. Columbia, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (1917)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Goldenkoff v. Albany, 191 N.Y.S. 349 (1921)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Barker v. Bryn Mawr, 278 Pa. 121 (1923)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245 (1924)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Wood v Simpson, 146 Md. 547 (1924)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Stetson University v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510 (1925)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200 (1927)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Anthony v. Syracuse, 224 A.D. 487 (1928)

Univ

Priv

Disc


West v. Bd of Trustees, 41 Ohio App 367 (1931)

Univ

Pub

    

Acad


White v. Portia Law Sch., 274 Mass. 162 (1931)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193 (1932)

Univ

Pub

Acad


Univ of MD v. Coale, 165 Md. 224 (1933)

Univ

Pub

Disc


People v. Lory, 94 Colo. 595 (1934)

Univ

Pub

Acad


Hamilton v. UC, 293 U.S. 245 (1934)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99 (1942)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Bluett v. Univ. of IL, 10 Ill. App. 2d 207 (1956)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Dehaan v. Brandeis, 150 F.Supp. 626 (1957)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Robinson v. Univ of Miami, 100 So.2d 442 (1958)

Univ

Priv

Disc


Hanauer v. Elkins, 217 Md. 213 (1958)

Univ

Pub

Disc


Steier v. NY Ed Comm, 161 F.Supp. 549 (1958)

Univ

Pub

Acad




Cite This Article as: Teachers College Record Volume 116 Number 12, 2014, p. 1-16
https://www.tcrecord.org ID Number: 17688, Date Accessed: 12/6/2021 6:39:26 PM

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About the Author
  • Scott Gelber
    Wheaton College
    E-mail Author
    SCOTT GELBER is associate professor of education and associate professor of history (by courtesy) at Wheaton College in Massachusetts. He is completing a book on the legal history of American higher education (under contract with Johns Hopkins University Press). This research is being supported by a National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation postdoctoral fellowship. His previous book is The University and the People: Envisioning American Higher Education in an Era of Populist Protest (University of Wisconsin, 2011).
 
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