Home Articles Reader Opinion Editorial Book Reviews Discussion Writers Guide About TCRecord
transparent 13
Topics
Discussion
Announcements
 

The First Campaign and the Paradoxical Transformation of Fundraising in American Higher Education, 1915–1925


by Bruce A. Kimball - 2014

Background: Comprehensive, multi-year mass fundraising campaigns in American higher education began with the Harvard Endowment Fund (HEF) drive, which extended from 1915 to 1925. Notwithstanding this prominence, the archival records of the campaign have never been studied closely, and in the absence of archival research, scholars have misunderstood the HEF campaign. According to the received and presentist view, the university president initiated the HEF campaign, which professional consultants then directed to a swift and successful conclusion, drawing on their expertise.

Focus of study: The fundamental purpose was to learn from the archives what actually happened in this pathbreaking campaign. The research soon revealed that the unpaid organizers had to negotiate virtually all aspects of this novel venture among competing and conflicting groups of alumni, units of the university, and university administrators, including the president. The purpose then became to understand the divergent values and interests of the participants and how those perspectives contributed to the new goals, strategies, tactics, and practices introduced by the campaign.

Setting: The research was conducted primarily in the Harvard University Archives and the Special Collections of Harvard Business School library.

Research Design: The archival records comprise some fifty three boxes containing about forty thousand unindexed sheets of letters, memos, drafts, minutes, accounts, pamphlets, and other materials reposited in the Harvard University Archives. A chronological and topical examination of these materials over the past five years provides the research for this essay, which also draws upon a review of related collections in the Harvard University Archives and the Special Collections of Harvard Business School library.

Conclusions: The research led to several surprising conclusions: that the landmark campaign failed to meet its goal, that professional consultants did not organize or run the campaign but emerged from it, that now long-standing features of university fundraising resulted less from deliberate planning than from contentious negotiations among conflicting groups, that the campaign prompted the university administration to centralize and control alumni affairs and development efforts for the first time, and, above all, that a central ideological tension arose between mass fundraising and the traditional approach of discretely soliciting wealthy donors. The unintended and unofficial outcome was to establish today’s ubiquitous episodic pattern of continuous fundraising, in which mass comprehensive campaigns alternate with discrete solicitations of wealthy donors, whose dominant roles have never changed.



Nothing is more predictable today at colleges and universities than the launch of a comprehensive multi-year mass fundraising campaign, which, inevitably, “is the largest fundraising endeavor in the university’s history.”1 The initial such campaign in American higher education was the Harvard Endowment Fund drive (HEF) that ran from 1915 to 1925 and transformed the nature of fundraising by colleges and universities. To be sure, leaders in American higher education since the founding of the first colonial college in 1636 had sought funds for their institutions by soliciting wealthy individuals, conducting lotteries, and enlisting subscribers. But comprehensive multi-year mass campaigns relying on paid staff did not appear until the famous HEF campaign, which was rapidly emulated by several hundred other colleges and universities.


This ten-year effort vastly expanded the dimensions and tactics of higher education fundraising. Its size was unprecedented in several respects: the amount to be raised, the years involved in planning and canvassing, and the network of three thousand volunteers soliciting thirty-six thousand alumni divided into seventy districts around the world. Due to the unprecedented size, the leaders adopted a businesslike strategy of building a corporate organization, hiring a full-time staff, opening offices, keeping formal accounts, issuing regular reports, and so forth.2 The HEF campaign also drew novel tactics from the contemporary public drives for mass giving that commenced a decade earlier. These tactics included the careful analysis of prospects, the quiet running start, the orchestrated publicity, the convening and educating of leading volunteers, and the whirlwind push.


In addition, the HEF campaign inaugurated two changes in institutional governance in higher education. On the one hand, the university began to harness the fundraising efforts of its various departments and units, which were accustomed to seeking gifts at their own discretion. On the other hand, the university assimilated and consolidated the disparate associations, publications, and fundraising projects of alumni and established authority over the entire domain of alumni affairs.


Furthermore, the HEF introduced into higher education fundraising five other innovations that proved paradoxical in certain respects. First, the new “businesslike” strategy entailed justifying the campaign goal through a careful financial analysis of Harvard’s costs, rather than appealing to donors’ sentiments as did the public drives for mass giving. Second, the HEF dedicated itself to the novel “primary” purpose of increasing unrestricted endowment.3 But this purpose did not depend on a cost analysis because the need for endowment was elastic. The HEF therefore identified another purpose requiring that analysis—raising faculty salaries—but never reconciled this new aim with the primary purpose. Furthermore, the campaign goal was actually determined by how much the HEF leaders thought they could raise. Consequently, the innovative commitment to a businesslike analysis was paradoxical. It did not address the primary campaign purpose and, even if it had, that purpose did not determine the campaign goal. Further complicating matters, this paradox stemmed largely from a lack of cooperation by Harvard president A. L. Lowell, who should have been most interested in assisting the campaign.


Third, the HEF drive vastly increased the ambitions and expectations of fundraising by other institutions across the nation, inspiring campaigns at several hundred colleges and universities within a few years. But the HEF campaign actually fell short of its goal, dismaying its leaders. The failed campaign paradoxically became an exemplar of success and a source of admiration. Fourth, the HEF drive established the new profession of consulting for higher education fundraising supposedly because it was run by the first such consulting firm, which became the most successful over the next fifty years. But unpaid alumni actually planned and directed the campaign, and that first consulting firm was formed by a few of the HEF staff who left as the drive ran into trouble. Paradoxically, those who abandoned the campaign and later took credit for its supposed success established the new profession of consulting for higher education fundraising.


Lastly, the HEF introduced public mass fundraising into higher education, which traditionally had relied on discretely soliciting wealthy donors. Notwithstanding its trumpeted success, by 1920 the HEF approach appeared to some to be ineffective, inefficient, and even counterproductive, and wealthy donors continued to dominate giving at Harvard and elsewhere. The HEF drive therefore established the mythical value of public mass campaigns in higher education. In fact, they became episodic marginal supplements to the substantive discrete giving by the wealthy elite, whose dominant role never changed. The unintended and unofficial outcome of the HEF campaign was therefore to establish today’s ubiquitous episodic pattern of continuous fundraising, in which mass comprehensive campaigns alternate with discrete solicitations of wealthy donors. The paradox here is that the introduction of mass fundraising reaffirmed the influence of the wealthy elite.


BACKGROUND AND HISTORIOGRAPHY


Prior to 1865 the economy of the United States did not produce enough surplus wealth to support significant benefactions, and most gifts were made for current use. Between 1870 and 1920 the gross national product grew more than six-fold as the rise of industrial capitalism, particularly in the areas of transportation, communication, and manufacturing, fueled a great economic expansion. This led to an enormous increase in philanthropy, most of which flowed into colleges and universities. Contemporary observers considered this late nineteenth-century wave of benefactions to be “one of the most striking phases of American educational history.”4


While these developments continued the tradition that benefaction in the United States was primarily “a prerogative and a responsibility of the wealthy and of the businessman,” there also emerged between 1900 and 1920 the new phenomenon of “mass giving” or “people’s philanthropy.”5 Associations devoted to improving health care and social welfare expanded philanthropy beyond the wealthy elite by developing the tactics of appealing broadly to the public for donations. In particular, the multimillion-dollar campaigns of the Young Men’s Christian Association and the Red Cross and the billion-dollar campaigns for disaster relief and U.S. Liberty Loan bonds during World War I made mass fundraising a common occurrence in American life.6


Scholars have attributed the rise of “people’s philanthropy” early in the twentieth century to various factors. These include the increase in disposable income due to the rising standard of living, the shift from religious to secular rationales for giving, the self-interest served by social welfare and health care campaigns and by community chest and federated campaigns, the professional development of mass fundraising techniques, the psychological gratification of engaging in a practice traditionally reserved for the elite, and the altruistic response to those in need, particularly during World War I.7 Whatever the factors that propelled it in the public sphere, mass giving advanced slowly in higher education where the traditional pattern of giving by wealthy donors yielded slowly.


In 1890 graduates of Yale University established the first annual alumni fund, and in subsequent decades the Yale Alumni Fund operated successfully without missing a year. But it did not raise a great deal of money initially, and the university spent most of the proceeds on current expenses. Through 1905 the Yale Alumni Fund collected a total of about $240,000 and directed only $113,000 into endowment. Perhaps for this reason, few institutions adopted the annual alumni canvass until after World War I.8 In 1905 Harvard alumni introduced an alternative approach when the college class of 1880 made a twenty-fifth reunion gift of $100,000 in endowment to its alma mater, nearly matching the endowment built by the Yale Alumni Fund over the previous fifteen years. In 1906 the class of 1881 donated $118,000, establishing the custom of twenty-fifth reunion giving.9 Meanwhile, in honor of its bicentennial in 1901 Yale raised nearly $2 million from its alumni for new buildings and other projects, and in 1904–5 Harvard College netted nearly $2.5 million for endowment through a loosely organized campaign led by the renowned volunteer fundraiser Episcopal Bishop William Lawrence, who guided the Episcopal Church Pension Fund drive in the 1910s.10


Notwithstanding these early initiatives, prior to World War I “major gifts from the wealthy were chiefly responsible for the growth of university capital,” and “broad-based giving.. . . . was a distinct exception,” as Roger Geiger has observed. “In the postwar period this would no longer be true.” Mass fundraising flooded into higher education soon after 1919 and transformed university fundraising, which “acquired permanent organizational features”11 found in today’s ‘traditional capital campaign’ or ‘comprehensive campaign.’”12 This transformation commenced in the HEF drive, which “made fund-raising history” and “developed many of the patterns and procedures that are currently used in educational fund raising.”13


Long considered a landmark,14 the HEF was viewed at the time as pathbreaking, for “no university has gone at the situation as we intend to go at it,” promised the HEF chairman Thomas W. Lamont.15 Notwithstanding this prominence, the archival records of the campaign have never been studied closely. These records comprise some fifty three boxes containing about forty thousand sheets of letters, memos, drafts, minutes, accounts, pamphlets, and other materials reposited in the Harvard University Archives. A chronological and topical examination of these unindexed materials over the past five years provides the research for this essay, which also draws upon a review of related collections in the Harvard University Archives and the Special Collections of Harvard Business School library.16


In the absence of thorough archival research, scholars have misunderstood the HEF campaign. In particular, the landmark history of fundraising by Scott M. Cutlip draws heavily upon self-promoting accounts written by the professional fundraising firm spawned by the HEF campaign. Subsequent scholars have relied on Cutlip, on his sources, or, to a lesser extent, on a flawed history of Harvard’s finances.17 According to this received view, professional consultants directed the HEF campaign to a swift and successful conclusion during 1919, while a few scholars have suggested that President Lowell initiated the campaign.18 By either account, the alumni volunteers are portrayed as obliging followers of the professionals or the president or both.


But the archives reveal a different course of events. Unpaid alumni planned and directed the HEF campaign, and Lowell did not cooperate with the campaign, let alone lead it. The first consulting firm for fundraising in higher education was formed by HEF staff who jumped ship just as it ran aground and only two-thirds of the goal had been reached. Furthermore, the HEF drive began with high hopes in 1915, ceased during World War II, resumed in 1919, dragged on inconclusively in the early 1920s, and trailed off in 1925 with organizers privately admitting defeat, while the university publically declared victory. This deflating outcome culminated the transformative campaign, which proved paradoxical in significant respects.


NEW DIMENSIONS, TACTICS, AND GOVERNANCE CHANGES, 1915–1917


In the summer of 1915 a small group of Harvard-educated lawyers and financiers began discussing the idea of organizing an unprecedented fundraising campaign on behalf of their alma mater. The early driving force was Lamont, vice president of J. P. Morgan and Co., the leading banking house in the country, located in New York City. Other core figures were John W. Prentiss, a partner in a Boston investment firm who eventually became treasurer of the HEF; John B. Richardson, an attorney in a leading Boston law firm; and his partner, Thomas N. Perkins, one of the seven members of the Harvard Corporation, the university’s governing board. Another leader was Eliot Wadsworth, who retired as the financial officer of an engineering firm in 1916 in Boston, then directed the American Red Cross until 1919 and later served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.19


From their earliest meetings, these core leaders proposed new dimensions and tactics for higher education fundraising. The size and scope of this effort would be “many times larger than any college has previously attempted.”20 By “laying plans for probably the biggest, longest, and most important campaign of its kind ever undertaken in this country,”21 they envisioned “a far-reaching, systematic campaign”22 in the mold of public mass giving. In addition, reflecting their corporate background, they believed it “necessary to organize on a much larger and more businesslike scale”23 and to approach the HEF drive “just as any big business project must be handled.”24

In contrast to the Yale Alumni Fund or the Harvard drive of 1904–5, they therefore decided to open offices and “create a permanent salaried organization that will work steadily on this, and on nothing else.”25 In October 1916 Lamont hired as HEF secretary Robert F. Duncan, a young alumnus and newspaper reporter, who opened the first office in Cambridge and then the headquarters on Broadway in New York City in April 1917.26 As the staff gradually grew to about twenty, Lamont sought to hire a senior business-minded person to take charge of the campaign, including the dean of the fledgling Harvard Business School.27 Also, in contrast to the approach of Bishop Lawrence, who kept all the records “under my hat” when he ran a campaign,28 the HEF leaders standardized the financial bookkeeping and established bank accounts with formal protocols of signing authority.29


Meanwhile, the planning for the HEF campaign precipitated disagreements that gradually led to two changes in governance at Harvard. Internally, the university began to monitor, prioritize, and control fundraising by its departments. Throughout the nineteenth century, Harvard had encouraged departments to seek funds for themselves, and they made appeals largely without oversight or limitations. But early in the twentieth century, university officials began to see problems in unrestrained “miscellaneous begging.”30 In 1907 Harvard President Charles W. Eliot observed that “the friends of the University are sometimes solicited to give money simultaneously for several different objects, thereby creating a conflict of benevolences.” Hence, the Corporation requested that it be consulted by departments seeking gifts.31 But miscellaneous begging continued, and by 1914 the Harvard Corporation had created a Committee on Resources, “whose object is to coordinate the begging for different University objects.”32


Yet, the lack of coordination and oversight continued through 1916 and 1917 when the budding HEF encountered it. For the university to control, or even monitor, fundraising endeavors was still a novel idea, and the Harvard Alumni Bulletin therefore refrained “from using its pages for financial appeals on behalf of one Harvard enterprise [or] another, however worthy each cause might be.” 33 Intending to solicit all Harvard alumni for the benefit of the entire university, HEF leaders felt their drive deserved priority, and they convinced the Bulletin to ignore its policy and support the HEF.34 In addition, President Lowell assured Lamont that he would try “to prevent any requests from being made for money on behalf of any department in the University” during the campaign,35 and the Corporation adopted this “keep off the grass” policy,36 which the HEF thus brought into effect.


The other external change in governance was that the university assimilated and consolidated the disparate associations, publications, and fundraising projects of alumni, which had operated independently through 1910. As a result, the university established authority over alumni affairs and over funds raised by alumni classes for its benefit. Alumni groups naturally resisted this arrangement, especially the Harvard Alumni Association (HAA), the alumni body organized by the graduation classes and officially recognized by the university as representing the alumni.


In the past, the university had sometimes appealed broadly to all alumni in subscription campaigns, but the classes were the incubators of alumni allegiance and the most reliable conduits to the purses of the alumni. The HAA was accustomed to controlling those conduits, tapping them for its own expenses, and exercising some oversight on the money that went to the university. Under this arrangement, funds raised to support the activities and expenses of the classes went into “Class Funds,” and funds for the benefit of the university went into “Class Subscription Funds.”37 The Yale Alumni Fund worked similarly; the money was held in an account controlled not by the university but by alumni “directors,” appointed by the president.38


When the HEF core group began proposing in mid-1915 that the entire alumni body raise an unprecedented amount of unrestricted endowment for the university, certain HAA leaders assumed that their association would control the money raised and receive a portion, as had been customary. They proposed to establish a trust, separate from the university with an independent board of trustees, that would hold the money for the benefit of the university.39 This arrangement approximated the governance of many entities at other universities, including the Yale Alumni Fund. Though belonging to the HAA and wanting its authorization, the HEF leaders wished to circumvent its control of their novel mass campaign.


Over the last half of 1915 negotiations proceeded. HAA leaders suggested that they might run a competing endowment campaign if their association did not reap from the HEF drive, while the HEF core leaders realized that including the HAA would alleviate its need for annual solicitations during the HEF campaign. Hence, a deal was struck. HAA was allocated 20 percent of the annual income from the new endowment, up to a maximum of $10,000 annually, and HAA ceded ownership, possession, and control of the new fund to the Harvard Corporation. This agreement was codified in a “deed of trust” approved during 1916.40


But both sides chafed at the bargain. Lowell and the Corporation did not like the arrangement of, essentially, paying off the HAA to gain access to the alumni classes. HAA leaders continued to argue that alumni should partake of and retain control over what they raise. One cited the Princeton Alumni Council, whose members guaranteed $50,000 each year to the college, raised all they could, took their expenses, donated the promised $50,000, and then decided on their own how to spend the rest for the benefit of Princeton. “That is a frank . . . .recognition of the fact that the graduates . . . furnish the money and are, therefore, . . . given some responsibility in its disposition,” said HAA leaders. “This is . . . far superior to the present Harvard Endowment Fund plan.”41 Nevertheless, the deed of trust remained in place, and when the Harvard Annual Alumni Fund was founded in the early 1920s no such negotiations were necessary.42 The alumni had forever ceded to the university control over funds that they raised for its benefit.


As the HAA gradually slipped into harness, the HEF realized that it needed four other alumni agencies to cooperate as well: the Association of Class Secretaries; the Associated Harvard Clubs (AHC), comprising the clubs formed by graduates according to their geographic areas; and the two semi-autonomous publications available to alumni by subscription—the monthly Harvard Graduates’ Magazine and the weekly Harvard Alumni Bulletin.43 However, the HEF requests for help led these four, like the HAA, to see that their own interests might be compromised. Given the absence of oversight by the university administration, the HEF had to persuade each to cooperate.


In purely numerical terms, the HEF leaders expected to need some three thousand volunteers to canvass the thirty-six thousand graduates and former students of the university. They saw no need to create a new alumni network when the HAA and AHC already existed, but the two organizations were competitive rather than collaborative. The university officially recognized the HAA, but the AHC was “much more powerful and . . . effective.”44 The competition intensified during summer 1916, when AHC demanded the allocation designated for HAA from the future income of the HEF endowment. This demand not only undermined collaboration but jeopardized approval of the deed of trust by the Corporation, which was unhappy with the allocation arrangement.45


Negotiations proceeded unsuccessfully during fall 1916, until AHC proposed starting its own competing endowment fund campaign. HAA then acquiesced to splitting its allocation with AHC, which agreed to help the HEF effort. But the cooperation proved ephemeral because, when it came time to split the first allocation, the HAA reneged and wanted to keep the entire allocation, complaining that it had to cover its deficit.46 By January 1918 Lamont was exasperated by the negotiations with HAA and AHC.47 Just at that point the two groups began discussing an “amalgamation” because the rising prominence of the HEF campaign had taught them that the competition and divisiveness between two alumni organizations was not beneficial to anyone.48

The HEF also encountered resistance from the Association of Class Secretaries, which was vitally important, though small and loosely organized. Only these secretaries had lists of the donors who had given to past class subscription campaigns for the benefit of the university. The university treasurer had names of alumni who had given directly to the university as individuals but not those who had subscribed to class drives to support scholarships, buildings, reunion funds, and so forth. In late 1916 the HEF began to request copies of the lists of donors from class secretaries, but few secretaries wanted to reveal the golden geese whom they might wish to solicit in the future.49


Similarly, the HEF needed robust communication channels with all thirty-six thousand alumni and did not want to duplicate existing publications. But the Harvard Graduates’ Magazine and Harvard Alumni Bulletin pursued their own agendas, and no one in the university administration was willing to intervene. The HAA, AHC, and HEF all urged that Harvard adopt the Princeton system of sending the publications to every alumnus free of charge and charging the cost to the corresponding class.50 It took until mid-1919 for the HEF, allied with HAA and AHC, to work out a cooperative arrangement with the Magazine and the Bulletin that resulted in “a complete rearrangement of our permanent scheme of publicity” at the university.51 The other three agencies began to take similar steps, and by the end of the campaign, the HEF had catalyzed a new governance arrangement whereby the alumni associations and publications “will all be closely linked together and work harmoniously along intelligent lines” within the university and under its authority.52


BEGINNING AND BORROWING FROM THE MASS CAMPAIGNS, 1916–1919


In spring 1916, as provided by the deed of trust, the HAA president formally appointed the fifteen members of the HEF Committee, including the six core leaders, and they elected Lamont chairman. In order to rebut criticism about the dominance of “cold, fishy, bloodless Boston,” he named an executive committee of five members from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and St. Louis.”53 In the closing months of 1916 the HEF leaders began to adopt tactics from “people’s philanthropy.”


Duncan started systematically compiling lists of prospects and evaluating them for giving potential and interest,54 while Committee members attempted the running start of quietly obtaining a number of large pledges in advance.55 For example, Lamont approached his boss, John P. Morgan, Jr. Hoping to obtain a big donation, Lamont cagily asked Morgan to pledge “twice as much as . . . I myself might give.” Morgan “replied, with a twinkle in his eye, that he would promise to do this if I would promise to give half whatever he might give.” Morgan “named 100,000 dollars as his gift, and I was in for 50,000 dollars, which . . . was considerably more than I had felt I could put myself down for.”56


In January 1917 the Committee publically announced the campaign with a goal of $10 million, which was about a third of Harvard’s total endowment the time.57 But war loomed ominously in spring 1917, and alumni clamored to halt the HEF drive in deference to the campaigns for disaster relief and Liberty Loans associated with the war. In May 1917 the Committee voted to postpone the campaign, and Duncan closed the office and went to assist Eliot Wadsworth at the Red Cross headquarters in Washington, DC. Nevertheless, in June the HEF reached its interim goal of $1 million so that Lowell could announce the achievement at commencement.58 Though postponed, the campaign had started auspiciously.


Soon after the war ended on November 11, 1918, Lamont optimistically wrote to the Committee that the HEF drive could be revived and completed by December 1919. He believed that people “have been educated during the war to giving on a large scale” by the massive campaigns run for the Liberty Loans, Red Cross, and other relief agencies.59 In late January, however, Lamont was called to Europe for five months to serve as financial advisor to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, so Wadsworth left the Red Cross in March and became the chairman of the expanded fifteen-member Executive Committee.60


Wadsworth named Edgar H. Wells, an alumnus and his assistant at the Red Cross, to be vice-chairman, and together they directed the campaign, while Duncan returned as secretary.61 An important figure on the Executive Committee was alumnus Guy Emerson, who had managed the Episcopal Church Pension Fund drive under Bishop Lawrence and served as the Publicity Director for the Liberty Loan campaigns in the New York district, the largest in the country.62 Another key figure was Emerson’s Assistant Publicity Director, John Price Jones, a Harvard alumnus, who arrived in May 1919 as General Manager “to undertake the detail . . . on the organization.”63


All these individuals drew extensively from their experience in the largest fundraising campaigns, disaster relief efforts, and European reconstruction projects, as the press observed. For example, Wadsworth prepared the Campaign Book of the Harvard Endowment Fund Committee, which reinforced the corporate organization of the campaign and included a detailed management chart of the staff and the volunteer committees.64 These individuals also provided the campaign with the “zone plan” whereby “the entire world has been laid out in [70] divisions.” Each division had a chairman who appointed vice-chairmen over subdivisions who then formed local committees that appointed canvassers. By this plan, Wadsworth told the press, “We shall have between four and five thousand Harvard men . . . personally talking with . . . every one of the 36,000 men who have attended Harvard."65 The size of the organizational pyramid was unprecedented in higher education.


Wadsworth also adopted the tactic of convening and educating the leading volunteers. In July he organized an “Old Grad’s Summer School” to bring the seventy divisional chairmen to Cambridge for three days. The purpose was to explain the strategy of mass fundraising presented in his Campaign Book and to justify the campaign by having Harvard’s academic leaders present the needs and opportunities of their departments. Initially worried whether any would come, Wadsworth was amazed that almost all the chairmen attended.66 The press gave widespread publicity; university leaders persuasively explained the needs; the attendees unanimously endorsed the plans for the campaign. The Old Grad’s Summer School received accolades.67


Above all, the campaign borrowed publicity techniques from the mass campaigns. HEF leaders recognized that “we live in an age of advertisement. Lipton’s teas, Sapolio, and a hundred other things . . . force themselves upon you.”68 Undertaking such “education” about the campaign in 1916, Duncan and Lamont had written a series of articles for the Harvard Alumni Bulletin and the Boston and New York press, followed during spring 1917 by pamphlets and circular letters sent to all alumni.69 In 1919 Wadsworth, Wells, and Emerson amplified the effort by organizing a Publicity Committee in each division. They also established at the HEF headquarters a Publicity Department, comprising a Press Bureau, an Advertising Bureau, and a Speakers’ Bureau, which organized visits by university figures to events held in the divisions.70


Jones took charge of the publicity and secured widespread coverage in newspapers and magazines throughout the country. In September, he reported news clippings amounting to “over 800 columns of Harvard Endowment Fund publicity. This does not represent . . . one-fifth of the total. For instance, . . . our interview with President Lowell was printed in fifty-five papers in this country, and we have up to date received only four clippings of it.”71 Lamont was “delighted and amazed.”72 At the same time, in keeping with his promotional bent, Jones tended to exaggerate his role, implying by his title of General Manager that he ran the entire campaign and attempting to communicate directly with Lowell about campaign matters.73 But Jones did not sit on the HEF executive committee until shortly before he left the campaign and did not have any spending authority. Even within the domain of publicity, Jones submitted his press releases to Lamont or Wadsworth for approval and was not party to arranging publicity of prominent Harvard figures.74


FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, UNRESTRICTED ENDOWMENT, AND CAMPAIGN GOAL, 1917–1919


Certain significant innovations introduced by the HEF drive proved paradoxical. One was the new commitment to run a businesslike campaign,75 which led to a number of calculated policies. In order to make large gifts financially prudent, the HEF allowed pledges to be paid on installments over five years and promoted the new provision for charitable deductions under the federal income tax established in 1913.76 Also, Lamont, Morgan, Prentiss, Wadsworth, Emerson, and others made separate contributions to cover the expenses of the campaign so that the HEF could assure donors “that every dollar which is given will go directly . . . for the needs of the University and the Alumni organizations.”77 Conversely, the HEF resisted a number of solicitation schemes that smacked of financial speculation.78


Above all, the new businesslike approach to fundraising demanded a careful financial analysis of Harvard’s costs to justify the campaign goal. This demand responded to the popular view “that Harvard is a rich institution which has only to ask for money in order to obtain it in limitless amounts.”79 In 1916 the HEF leaders therefore started emphasizing “the dire need of the University before saying a word to solve the problem.”80 They announced “that Harvard’s financial position is not secure.”81 Indeed, “the present crisis confronting the university” was profound.82 Consequently, the HEF appeal would merely “free Harvard from the financial anxiety which is now besetting almost every private institution of learning in the country.”83


In order to validate this “crisis” and “anxiety,” HEF leaders planned to present a cost analysis “to show clearly to the most practical business man that Harvard needs these additional funds.”84 Specifically, the analysis would demonstrate that Harvard was spending “to meet . . . reasonable needs,” incurring annual deficits because its income was inadequate and then covering the deficits by expending capital funds and annual gifts.85 The only solution was to increase income. But tuition had been raised by a third in 1913, so students had done their part. Consequently, “no effort should be spared to see that the whole sum so greatly needed by the University is raised at the earliest possible moment.”86 But this novel commitment to provide a thorough cost analysis did not fit another innovation: the primary HEF purpose of directing mass giving toward “unrestricted endowment.”87


In the early 1900s the importance of unrestricted endowment was not widely appreciated and required extensive justification by the HEF leaders.88 They therefore invoked the lessons taught by President Eliot about “free money” during his administration from 1869 to 1909, when all the members of the HEF committee attended Harvard.89 HEF literature prominently quoted Eliot’s signal statement: “The value of unrestricted gifts . . . is always mounting and becoming more generally recognized; . . . The University needs free money. . . . In the competition between American universities, and between American and foreign universities, those universities will inevitably win which have the largest amounts of free money.”90 Hence, HEF leaders never tired of reiterating “what Harvard as a whole needs most is an unrestricted endowment, and that is the main object of our Committee.”91 Beyond the amount collected, they maintained “it is very important to educate the graduates to the idea that an unrestricted fund is more important than any other.”92


Furthermore, unrestricted endowment had usually come from wealthy donors, often as bequests, and rarely through small donations.93 The combined emphasis on mass giving and unrestricted endowment therefore constituted a significant innovation “to provide the University with a permanent, unrestricted income, based on . . . gifts, no matter how small, from every Harvard man.”94 Beginning in summer 1915, HEF leaders advanced this novel purpose “to afford an annual opportunity for graduates to contribute in amounts, however small, to an Endowment Fund for the University.”95 Small marginal givers were invited to act like major elite donors.

Yet, not everyone embraced the importance of unrestricted endowment. A number of departments simply refused to relinquish what they considered their right to solicit anyone at any time for their own restricted purposes.96 The HEF had to acquiesce to miscellaneous begging by several units, including the arboretum, law school, twenty-fifth reunion classes, chemistry department, and dental school.97 As a consolation, they decided to allow certain restricted gifts to count toward the campaign total. Though fearing that the restricted purposes would draw away unrestricted gifts, they worried more that any donations would be lost. “Let no guilty man escape!” they repeated, quoting Bishop Lawrence.98


Indeed, HEF leaders began to see an advantage in the complementary approach: “although there is a general insistence on . . . unrestricted funds and the more we can get the better, yet there is also a good deal of . . . value of reaching a man on his most interested side, whatever it may be, education, charity, sciences, . . . compulsory physical training, dormitories, and so on.”99 By summer 1919, the Executive Committee willingly entertained proposals of needs and wants from various departments of the university, even as they continued to insist that “the primary need of Harvard University today is an addition to its unrestricted endowment.”100 The equivocation was manifested in the haphazard and incomplete HEF record keeping of restricted gifts.101


While the competition for restricted gifts might therefore be accommodated, the primary purpose of increasing unrestricted endowment did not require the commitment to provide a cost analysis. The need for unrestricted endowment was justified on other grounds. Eliot had emphasized a competitive and Darwinian rationale, and the HEF leaders echoed him, arguing “that, if Harvard is to maintain her supremacy among the universities of America, she must have a largely increased endowment.”102 But this competitive rationale did not suit a public campaign, so they also argued, as did Eliot, that unrestricted endowment helps Harvard serve the nation and the world. Furthermore, they maintained that the HEF is “an enterprise of prime importance not only to Harvard but to the whole cause of American education.”103 If the HEF is successful, then other universities can succeed in this endeavor. A graduate of the University of Vermont, Harvard Law School, and Columbia University wrote to the HEF office, “You are doing great work for education all over the country . . . by tilling the ground for endowment campaigns for other colleges. . . . Our gifts to the Harvard Fund will make us ashamed not to do as well for our own colleges when they start their campaigns.”104


But these rationales for unrestricted endowment did not meet the demand for a financial analysis showing that Harvard’s costs and spending were “reasonable.” 105 Without that analysis, business-minded donors might balk, so a compelling instance of financial need was identified in the fact that faculty salaries had not been raised since 1905. Between 1908 and 1917 inflation had driven down the purchasing power of the faculty salary scale about 44 percent, while industrial wages had kept pace with prices.106 Here was a compelling instance of need. In 1917 the university treasurer therefore recommended to HEF leaders “that figures from the Treasurer’s reports would not make as strong a case for us as hammering on the salary argument alone.”107 Inflation continued to rise during the war, strengthening the argument, and by mid-1919 HEF leaders concluded that “the need of raising salaries is the one thing of overshadowing importance.” This need “requires very little investigation or argument” to be persuasive.108


The HEF executive committee therefore adopted raising faculty salaries as another purpose of the campaign. The HEF literature and public press began announcing it prominently in 1917,109 and the drumbeat resumed in 1919 when the HEF drive even received “the whole-souled endorse­ment of labor.”110 In this fashion, the problem of Harvard’s financial “crisis” was converted to low salaries: “The reason that the University has not shown dangerous deficits in the past years is due, primarily, to the fact that we are not paying a fair living wage to our teaching staff.”111 Harvard has “an invisible moral deficit of 600,000 dollars a year, met by the self-sacrifice of a loyal, underpaid teaching staff.”112 Accordingly, the campaign justified its goal by retroactively calculating the endowment goal in terms of the income needed to raise faculty pay. Professors’ salaries “should be increased immediately, if possible, on an average of fifty per cent. This would require 600,000 dollars, the income at five per cent on 12,000,000 dollars.”113 This purpose and the associated financial analysis thus justified the campaign goal, while it was taken for granted that no reductions could be made in the rest of Harvard’s budget.


Dozens of colleges and universities embraced this argument and adopted the justification for their endowment campaigns in the early 1920s.114 But the HEF drive was misleading on this point. The leaders and many alumni remained focused on the primary need for unrestricted endowment, while many other alumni responded enthusiastically to the restricted purpose of raising faculty salaries. The HEF leaders tried to have it both ways: “If you give your money to the Harvard Endowment Fund unrestricted, there is a most excellent chance that the income from that money will be used for that very purpose of raising salaries, because, although the income from the Endowment Fund is to be put at the unrestricted disposal of the Corporation, they are . . . bound to use a large part of it to increase teachers’ salaries.”115 Hence, they equivocated by asking for gifts for a restricted purpose that would go to unrestricted endowment with “a most excellent chance” of being used for the restricted purpose.


Moreover, the novel commitment “to show clearly to the most practical business man that Harvard needs these additional funds”116 led to a paradox. The financial analysis did not address the primary campaign purpose, and that was misleading. But even if it did, that purpose had little to do with the campaign goal. Instead, the goal was determined by how much the HEF leaders thought they could raise. As a result, the goal vacillated and increased as both the enthusiasm and the wish list grew.


Originally, Lamont identified a goal of $10 million in 1916.117 After the hiatus of World War I, the campaign publically announced a new goal of $11 million at the end of the Old Grad’s Summer School.118 A month later, that increased to $12.5 million in “urgent needs” and $5 million in “other important needs,” as departments competed for inclusion and priority in the campaign.119 In September the HEF announced “pressing needs” of $15.25 million plus another $2 million for additional purposes, as well as nearly $27 million in “Needs for the Future.”120 The grand total was a staggering $45 million, more than Harvard’s entire endowment at the time. Prudently, the HEF then settled on the goal of $15.25 million.121


According to campaign leaders, the goal vacillated and expanded because the university gradually realized that it needed additionally $1 million in endowment for the dental school, $1 million to build chemistry laboratories, and $1 million to match a $500,000 grant from the General Education Board to endow a new school of education.122 Above all, the goal had to be increased because “Harvard's income has not kept pace with the rising prices” due to war-time inflation and because faculty salaries needed to be raised.123 Given all this, it is not surprising that the archival records of the successive financial analyses and explanations issued by HEF for its goal are difficult to reconcile or even to follow.


The confusion results from the paradox arising from the way the goal was determined. Even while calling for a cost analysis, Lamont identified the original goal of $10 million in 1916 not through careful calculations based on data but because it seemed an ambitious, likely feasible, and attractively round number. Later, when asked to identify the needs that justified the campaign goal, Lowell observed privately “that the needs for the University for additional funds are always infinite, and the sum was really fixed by the amount which Mr. Lamont thought he could raise, and that he Lowell could adjust the needs accordingly.”124 Already 1917, HEF leaders had suggested that they could raise $20 million, and the enthusiasm of the summer school in 1919 led them to raise the goal accordingly.125


Today, it is often taken as a truism that universities will try to raise and spend all they can and always hunger for more.126 But it is important to see that the HEF view emerged from a particular set of obscuring historical circumstances—the paradox that they determined the campaign goal apart from the touted financial analysis, which was not required, in any case, by the primary campaign purpose. And this paradox stemmed from the lack of cooperation by President Lowell, as will be seen below.


THE PARADOX OF THE NEW PROFESSION, 1919


While adopting tactics from the public drives for mass giving, the HEF resisted their techniques relying on time pressure, manipulating information, or appealing to impulse or sympathy. “The tone or quality of the campaign must be materially different from that of a Liberty Loan, Red Cross or any other ‘popular’ drive we have had in the last two years,” wrote Wadsworth in the Campaign Book. “We must aim to develop enthusiasm without rough-and-tumble methods and through refined means.”127 Especially “inconsistent with the dignity of the University” was the whirlwind campaign—the paradigmatic invention of mass fundraising that featured a brief time frame, extensive publicity, high pressure, manipulation of data for effect, and the graphic clock or thermometer dramatizing results.128


Nevertheless, some HEF leaders began to argue that “we must be eminently practical, and, even distasteful as it may be, turn sentiment to practical uses.”129 This applied particularly to the timeline for the campaign as autumn 1919 approach. In 1917 Lamont had suggested needing two or three years to reach the goal of $10 million. In late 1918 Emerson had maintained, “So much has been learned with regard to the organization of money-raising campaigns that I think . . . the ten million dollars can be raised in less than a year.”130 Soon thereafter, Lamont proposed a seven month drive, including four months of planning. Early in 1919, having consulted several individuals in mass fundraising, Duncan argued that “we can raise more money in three weeks than in six months.”131 Responding to objections by the Executive Committee, Duncan observed that certain Harvard graduates involved in the Liberty Loans “could not agree that a whirlwind campaign would be undignified, and felt sure that it would be much more profitable.”132 By July the Executive Committee had capitulated to expediency and scheduled the HEF drive to last one week beginning on October 1.133


Following the Old Grad’s Summer School, planning and preparations picked up feverishly in August and September. The Committee of Twenty and $25,000 Club were formed to increase the disappointing number of large gifts. Harvard representatives visited at least twenty major cities across the country to speak on behalf of the HEF during September. On October 1 Lamont remarked that “attending Endowment dinners and luncheons is all that I have had a chance to do of late,” and in the following days the Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, New York Times, and many other papers reported heartening progress.134


At the end of the whirlwind week, however, the total stood well below 50 percent of the goal, and the deadline passed without comment. In mid-October the drive still had far to go, and the normally irrepressible Lamont reported, “I am pretty nearly down with nervous prostration.”135 On October 20 Wadsworth conceded to Lowell, “The campaign is going very slowly. We are probably over 7,000,000 dollars today.”136 A week later the Chicago Tribune reported that the drive had reached but half its goal, and the pace was slowing. In mid- November, the total inched up to 65 percent of the goal, and the solicitation in the seventy divisions officially ended, while the General Education Board declined to do more than its conditional grant of $500,000 for the School of Education, which did not count in the HEF total. “The Harvard Endowment Fund is dragging seriously,” acknowledged Perkins.137


Just at that point, Jones, Duncan, and four other staffers left to incorporate a consulting firm devoted to fundraising in higher education.138 This move originated in September when a few alumnae of Smith College, the alma mater of Lamont’s wife, asked Duncan whether HEF staff could help raise money for Smith. Duncan reported this to Jones, who suggested starting a business around the work. Jones then began writing to alumni groups of other private colleges and universities stoking interest in running endowment campaigns. One such letter mistakenly came to a Harvard alumnus who wrote back to Jones, asking why “a Harvard man soliciting a subscription to Harvard’s endowment should send such a request to an organization of alumni of another college.”139


Notwithstanding any conflict of interest, at the start of October both Lamont and Emerson, likely thinking that the HEF would soon end successfully, had given their blessing to Jones and Duncan to form a company and to draw on the HEF staff. In addition to Duncan, the forty-year-old Jones recruited two other recent Harvard graduates on the HEF staff, along with two secretaries, to join him in the new firm. On November 26, 1919, John Price Jones Inc. opened its office in New York City “for the purpose of planning and organizing and conducting publicity campaigns.”140 Indeed, Jones considered publicity to be the core of fundraising, and perhaps assumed that the widespread publicity ensured success for the HEF. In any case, many observers subsequently considered Jones’s corporation the most prominent and successful consulting firm in higher education fundraising through 1955, when he retired.141


THE PARADOX OF SUCCESS, 1920–1925


The HEF campaign limped into December without acknowledging past deadlines or identifying new ones. “The Harvard Endowment Fund is sticking,” wrote Perkins, “and as a result we are asking the men who have given if they cannot increase their subscriptions.”142 But returning to the well did not yield results, and the HEF leaders tried other approaches, as the campaign passed $10 million in mid-December. Lamont wrote to the Carnegie Corporation requesting a gift but was immediately denied. Wadsworth asked the Division Chairmen “to appoint cleanup committees, and use all means . . . to end the campaign by February first.”143 Since the zone plan was played out, the emphasis shifted to giving by alumni classes, which many on the executive committee had always favored.144 Finally, the HEF leaders asked the Harvard Corporation to raise faculty salaries while “making a very definite and clear statement that they did it” because the partial success of the fund might motivate “the slackers” to give.145 The Corporation responded by raising salaries by 20 percent as of January 1, a move that was carefully publicized and followed by another announced salary raise in March.146


The drive struggled on during 1920, as other colleges and universities announced campaigns prompted by the upbeat HEF publicity: Smith, Princeton, Cornell, M.I.T., Bryn Mawr, “then scores and finally hundreds of others,” observed Jones from his new firm.147


Already in February 1920, the New York Times reported that some seventy-five colleges and universities were seeking over $200 million.148 “We are following in your wake,” President Hibben of Princeton wrote to Lowell,149 never expecting that the HEF would soon run aground.


On March 1 the HEF campaign hit 79 percent of its goal, as Wells began soliciting graduate and undergraduate students at Harvard College. In spring he reviewed the list of noncontributing alumni and began writing to them. No one would escape. At commencement in 1920 Wadsworth spoke to the gathered alumni and observed that $12,157,765 had been pledged by 17,608 subscribers, including 16,337 alumni. “It is a splendid record but . . . leaves much to be desired,” he exhorted.150


In fall 1920 the original core leaders planned a final effort to raise the remaining $3 million and reach the goal of $15.25 million. The prospect of Harvard going “bankrupt” was invoked.151 But, among HEF organizers, the driving rationale now was that “the prestige of the University and its alumni will undoubtedly suffer if we fail to reach the total.”152 Harvard must not fail. Worse still, the HEF leaders feared “that we were going to see Harvard College take a licking in something that we have undertaken.”153


The final push would be “an intensive campaign,” lasting four weeks during November, which was organized around classes and focused upon those who had already donated.154 Setting aside the noncontributors, the HEF leaders calculated that they needed 33 percent more from those who had already given, and their only chance was to convince enough previous donors to double their pledges. Perkins, Prentiss, Richardson, Wadsworth, Emerson, and Wells threw themselves into the last-ditch effort, doubling their own pledges and soliciting others.155


In early December it became clear that the HEF would fall short because many major donors refused to double, including Lamont and Morgan. “The big money comes fairly hard,” Emerson remarked.156 On December 30 the total stood just above $13 million, and the offices in New York and Boston closed. The headquarters moved to the Harvard campus, with Wadsworth continuing as chair and an executive secretary, David Little, overseeing operations.157 Prompted by repeated suggestions over the previous four years, this relocation gave the president the opportunity “of putting all Alumni activities together into one place . . . on some systematic basis.”158 In this way, the university moved further in assimilating and supervising alumni affairs.


Although the campaign had officially ended, no one wanted to admit defeat, and the HEF leaders decided that “we should not announce that we have been beaten . . . but should let it drift along for times which are better than they are now.”159 Consequently, while steering clear of other Harvard efforts to raise money, the campaign continued to receive subscriptions and contributions and nursed the belief “that by 1925 the total will equal fifteen million.”160 Wadsworth, Lamont, and Wells continued nominally in charge of the enterprise, and Little received new pledges, collected outstanding ones, pursued delinquent and deceased donors, kept the records and statistics, and responded to the frequent inquiries about the campaign. Jones continued to advise Wadsworth about how to put the best public face on the outcome. In January 1925 subscriptions reached $13,945,000, or 92 percent of the goal, and in June the office closed and the drive finally expired ten years after conception.161


Nevertheless, Lowell declared the campaign a success, because it “saved the University from bankruptcy,” and Lowell was repeatedly quoted by HEF.162 Subsequent historians have likewise considered the campaign a success, relying on the testimony of Jones and Cutlip, who inflated the tally to $14.2 million and backdated it to November 1919, when Jones left the campaign.163 Yet, the shortfall was publicized, and the leaders felt keenly disappointed.164


Even the 92 percent in pledges might be discounted because 1 percent was never collected and 13 percent was restricted to purposes that lay outside the primary campaign purpose. Furthermore, in the doubling campaign that raised the final million, the HEF allowed subscribers to double the payment period to ten years. This doubling therefore included amounts that would have come to Harvard anyway, as the HEF leaders recognized and regretted.165 Extending the payment period demonstrated their desperation to make the goal. “It does not look as if we should succeed in getting our $15,250,000,” stated Perkins at the end of the doubling campaign, “and of course I am sorry.”166


The campaign fell short for several reasons, apart from the novelty of the enterprise. The interruption of the war detracted from the effort, as did the competition from other relief efforts in 1919. The departure of Jones, Duncan, and other key staff just as the campaign was foundering in November 1919 certainly took a toll. In 1920 and 1921 adverse business conditions dampened giving, particularly during the final intensive campaign.167 Although explanations from alumni for refusing to give are difficult to find, the few extant object to various policies of Lowell. Some nongivers disapproved of his emphasis on building dormitories and collegiate culture at Harvard. Others opposed his publically advocating the League of Nations and defending the academic freedom of instructor Harold J. Laski and law professor Felix Frankfurter. A few said that Lowell needed to conduct Harvard’s affairs “on a more businesslike basis,” and he responded in 1921 by “rapidly introducing a highly organized financial administration and a thorough budgetary system for every part of the University.” None of these complaints about Lowell seem to have significantly retarded giving, however.168


THE PRESIDENTIAL PARADOX


The university president would naturally be expected to embrace a pathbreaking fundraising effort by alumni, and Lowell made prominent statements supporting the drive that appeared in HEF publicity.169 These documents have led historians to maintain that Lowell actively encouraged or even initiated the campaign.170 But his public statements are belied by the archival records, which demonstrate a consistent pattern of dissembling that weakened the campaign and disaffected key leaders.


Lowell’s reservations were rooted in his preference for the traditional mode of securing gifts from wealthy donors and his aversion for mass fundraising, like many of his counterparts at the oldest private universities. Until 1902 Princeton chose as presidents Presbyterian clergymen who clung to their pastoral role and largely left money matters to the treasurer or trustees. The academic visionary Woodrow Wilson (1902–10) was reluctant to solicit gifts, even quietly from major donors, and Princeton fell behind other wealthy universities in financial resources until Hibben became president in 1912.171 At Yale, the clerical presidents in the late nineteenth century stated financial needs in their annual reports but confided finances to the university secretary and treasurer, while the alumni organized appeals largely unaided by the university administration. In 1899 economist Arthur T. Hadley (1899–1921) became the first Yale president not drawn from the clergy, but he eschewed mass fundraising and in 1919 haughtily dismissed an overture from HEF leaders, who then dropped him from their publicity plans while including Hibben.172 In 1920 Hadley announced that Yale was seeking $5 million in endowment to raise salaries—adopting the HEF rationale—and pointedly sniffed that $3 million had already come anonymously from one donor and that the remaining $2 million Yale “ought to be able to obtain quietly, without the necessity of anything like a public ‘drive.’”173


Hadley’s approach in 1920 had been the customary mode of presidential fundraising at the wealthy universities—quietly, discretely, often anonymously, and apparently effortlessly.174 The president worried about higher things, not mundane matters, and certainly did not ask for money in public. This traditional approach suited Lowell, a wealthy Boston Brahmin, as his authorized biography observed: “He rarely solicited a gift; he stated needs and gave all he could himself. Fortunately, anything more from him was rarely required.”175 More precisely, as HEF core leaders observed, “President Lowell . . . does not think it is the duty of the president to visit Harvard Clubs, or at any rate, he does not like to do it and does not think he is successful in this particular function.”176


Lowell’s preference derived not only from his social class and the customary mores of presidents at the old private institutions but also from his belief that quietly approaching wealthy individuals was both a more effective and a more efficient way to obtain gifts. Harvard deans had “often heard him say that . . . large sums . . . were best obtained from a few people rather than from many” and that a widespread appeal to alumni “brings the minimum of feathers with the maximum of squawking.”177 Indeed, the latter approach might do damage, Lowell believed, because “a recurring appeal to every alumnus for a small gift might interfere with more substantial donations.”178


When the HEF core leaders began to discuss their plans in 1915, Lowell therefore faced a dilemma. On the one hand, he needed money, preferred unrestricted endowment, and did not want to discourage helpful alumni, particularly well-connected lawyers and financiers. Hence, he repeatedly told them, “I will do anything you desire to help promote the campaign for the Harvard Endowment Fund.”179 On the other hand, he apparently did not believe that the HEF campaign was a good idea. Thus, he could have promoted the planning for the drive in his annual reports for 1915–6 and 1916–17, but waited until the report for 1917–8, published in 1919.180 When the president of Cornell University wrote to him asking about the campaign, Lowell responded curtly and coldly; and when a trustee of Mills College inquired, Lowell did not reply and had his secretary refer the trustee to Wadsworth.181 When Hadley wrote to Lowell criticizing the HEF overture noted above, Lowell responded sympathetically in a patrician tone, “You are quite right, but when your alumni are working very hard to raise an endowment for the college you hate to decline the requests they make, even when they ask you to sign things . . . defective in style.”182

Lowell negotiated this dilemma by voicing enthusiasm but acting slowly or halfheartedly when asked for tangible help. The overall pattern seemed insincere. Initially, it did not occur to HEF leaders that the president could have any reservations, so they sought to keep him closely informed and to obtain his advice and approval on every aspect of their plans. “Naturally, your views must govern our activities,” they wrote. “It is our desire to work thoroughly in accord with your wishes and with your cooperation.”183 But gradually HEF leaders found that they could not rely on the president, to their growing dismay and frustration. In particular, Lowell often approved a request but did not exercise his authority and left it to the HEF leaders to elicit agreement from the other parties affected. The president acted as a referee rather than an executive. In 1917, when Lamont asked Lowell if the dean of the fledgling business school could oversee the campaign, Lowell responded equivocally that “[I] will do anything you wish in this matter . . . if [the dean] can be persuaded to leave the Business School.”184


More equivocal was Lowell’s promise that he would “temporarily restrain all miscellaneous begging.”185 In September 1916 Lowell assured Lamont that, during the HEF campaign, “I will do everything I can to prevent any requests from being made for money on behalf of any department in the University.”186 In December, however, the president backpedaled, “There is a certain amount of continuous begging, . . . which I suppose would do no harm to have go on in the usual way. . . . The Physics Department is one of those that begs a little continuously.”187 Lamont acquiesced but stated what Lowell himself had affirmed, “The sooner that the graduates . . . feel that there is . . . a letting up in these small calls, the better for the big Endowment Fund.”188 By March 1917, the miscellaneous begging had not slackened, and Duncan observed in frustration, “In spite of President Lowell’s statement that he would try to quiet down all other campaigns for money, a new appeal from Harvard seems to get into the papers about every week.”189 Ever upbeat and patient, Lamont acted as though Lowell had not yet announced a prohibition in support of the HEF drive. But by 1918 others were becoming disgusted that “we have run into all sorts of schemes for raising money launched . . . by various departments of the University, all in spite of the fact that President Lowell told us that we were to have a clear field.”190


Meanwhile, rather than prohibiting departments from fundraising, Lowell began referring them to Lamont, who requested their cooperation but admitted, “I have no authority to ask you to stop collecting money.”191 In some cases, such as the arboretum and the law school, the HEF subsumed the appeals as restricted purposes, which Lowell considered “a very satisfactory arrangement.”192 Other departments insisted continuing on their own. In one case, Lamont explicitly asked the economics department to refrain from seeking an endowment of $100,000, and the department refused to comply. Lamont then offered to pay personally $5,000 to cover the annual income of the prospective endowment if the department postponed its appeal during the HEF campaign. The department agreed to this plan, as did Lowell, who talked as though everyone was content. But Lamont ruefully observed that “I am landed for the five,” and other HEF leaders felt that “none of these negotiations have been satisfactory to us.”193


When the campaign resumed at the end of the war, the HEF executive committee gave up seeking help from Lowell in this regard while insisting “that the Endowment Fund was to have right of way over all other Harvard appeals for money.”194 By the beginning of 1920 many departments were clamoring to raise money, and Lowell disingenuously asked the HEF executive committee whether the prohibition on other departments’ fundraising could be lifted. Lowell thus talked as though the HEF had benefitted from the prohibition that he had never enforced. In response, Wells complained to Lowell that many “indiscriminate” appeals were already underway, detracting from the HEF effort.195


Even more frustrating was Lowell’s reticence to provide data or statements in support of the campaign. For example, the HEF Publicity Department asked Lowell if he could provide one or two tributes or expressions of affection for Harvard that had come to him from alumni. Lowell had his secretary respond that he could not think of any.196 More significantly, the campaign required a statement from the president itemizing Harvard’s financial needs in order to develop the cost analysis to justify the campaign goal. Given that Lowell’s annual reports often discussed how “our needs are ever outrunning our resources,” the request seemed straightforward.197


Hence, at the end of December 1918, Lamont asked Lowell to write a brief letter outlining “the need for an endowment [of ten million dollars] yielding $500,000 annually,” which the HEF could print and mail to alumni along with detailed “literature on the financial status of the University as to show clearly to the most practical business man that Harvard needs these additional funds.”198 Lowell readily agreed but had not produced the letter after a month, so Lamont sent a reminder. Lowell responded by setting up a meeting with Lamont in New York to discuss the letter. A week later, when Lamont was about to leave for his five-month trip in Europe, Lowell cancelled the meeting, suggesting that Lamont’s departure forced the cancellation and, by extension, prevented Lowell from writing his letter.199


Wells then began requesting the presidential letter justifying the campaign, and Lowell’s secretary assured him that the president “fully intends to write something but feels that his statement ought not to be written until just before the campaign starts,”200 although the president “is ready to furnish . . . a statement whenever we wish it.”201 By the end of March, Wells tired of Lowell’s dissembling and told Lamont that he doubted that the university administration wished to cooperate with the HEF.202 Wadsworth and Wells meanwhile feared that only a thorough study of the university could provide the financial information needed by the campaign but that Lowell would not permit such a study.203


In April Lowell came up with a new reason why he could not write the requested letter. He could not identify the needs for the income from an endowment of $10 million, because that amount was Lamont’s idea and Lowell did not know how Lamont had calculated it. By mid-April Wells was ready to give up, but early in May asked Lowell again for his statement, which the president could amplify or amend later.204 Lowell then said that Lamont was the reason for the delay. “I have been waiting for marching orders from Mr. Lamont,” he stated, “because I can make out a statement of needs to any amount” since “our needs--that is, our opportunities for increased usefulness--are indefinite.” Therefore, “I want to know which needs I had better emphasize.”205


Wells did not know how to respond to Lowell’s “interesting letter” and suggested that Lowell include “all needs which are regarded as pressing.”206 Lowell then reaffirmed, “I will do anything you desire to help promote the campaign for the Harvard Endowment Fund,” but that he needed Lamont to identify and prioritize financial needs for the campaign.207 In June 1919 Lamont decided that he had had enough of Lowell’s dissembling and conceived a risky plan to circumvent the president. He proposed asking the Corporation to form a Committee of Survey to assess the financial needs of the university. Lamont cabled his idea to Wells and asked him to bring the cable to Morgan and discuss it. After that discussion, Wells advised Lamont, “It seems to me that your message [to the Corporation] amounts practically to a vote of lack of confidence in the present administration, and I fear that Mr. Lowell not only would resent it, but would be antagonized by it.”208


Evidently shaken by Lamont’s plan to stage a coup, Wells changed his tone and began emphasizing Lowell’s professions of cooperation. Lowell meanwhile may have gotten wind of Lamont’s disaffection because he promised to deliver his letter in time for the commencement issue of the Alumni Bulletin. Nevertheless, the HEF headquarters had to prod him daily over the last week and outline the contents in order for Lowell to produce the long-awaited statement at the last minute.209 Even then, Lowell began his letter to the alumni by strongly disavowing the task that the HEF assigned: “Do not for a moment regard this letter as a catalogue, or even a summary, of the University needs, but simply as putting together a few of its typical needs,” which are not “necessarily more important or pressing than others that are not mentioned. . . . I am trying to state only examples of some of our most urgent needs.”210 Lowell thus would not provide the financial justification for the campaign goal, but the HEF printed the letter in the Bulletin and in a pamphlet sent to thirty-six thousand alumni.211


By that point, Wadsworth had become the HEF chairman and during August 1919 he and Jones drafted a second letter for Lowell justifying the proposed endowment solely in terms of raising faculty salaries. Lowell approved this brief letter with little delay and wrote it out long hand to be electrotyped and distributed to alumni in late September.212 Lowell also visited Harvard Clubs in Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago in mid-September and in New York City during the whirlwind week in early October. In addition, he made a few personal solicitations to individuals.213


Nevertheless, Lowell had undermined the cause. By October 1919, entering what would become the most challenging and disheartening period of the campaign, the core leaders no longer looked to Lowell for guidance, approval, or help as they did in 1917. Rather than a champion and an inspiration for alumni giving, the president was a problem to be managed and a drain on time, energy, and good will of the leadership. Largely due to Lowell, the financial rationale for the campaign was muddled, restricted purposes blurred the focus on unrestricted endowment, and miscellaneous begging distracted potential givers. Above all, Lowell alienated Lamont, who been the driving force since 1915 and never resumed an active leading role in the campaign after returning from Europe in June 1919.


PARADOXICAL TRANSFORMATION OF MASS GIVING


The landmark HEF campaign fell short of its grand goal and failed in the view of its leaders, but transformed fundraising in higher education. The drive introduced new dimensions, tactics, and governance arrangements, as well as the innovations of the businesslike analysis, the importance of unrestricted endowment, the expectation of unprecedented success, the consulting profession, and the mass giving campaign.


Yet, Lowell may have been right. The HEF drive brought “the minimum of feathers with the maximum of squawking.”214 For all the three thousand volunteers, unprecedented publicity, and duration of nearly a decade, the HEF campaign failed to meet its goal because it did not attract major gifts. In July 1920 Wells complained that, in campaigns only a few months old with far less planning and publicity, Brown University had received five gifts averaging over $200,000, while Princeton had received a gift of $350,000 and another four of $250,000. By November 1920 Princeton had received four more gifts of $250,000. In contrast, the HEF drive recorded a total of four gifts over $100,000, including one for $143,000, two for $150,000, and merely one for $200,000, the highest.215 Princeton’s top five gifts totaled $1.3 million, Brown’s top five $1.1 million, and Harvard’s $743,000. As of November 1920, Princeton’s top nine gifts totaled $2.35 million, Harvard’s top nine $1,143,000. And Harvard had been squawking a lot longer and louder than Brown or Princeton.


As if to make the point, Lowell and the Corporation in 1923 launched their own drive under the slogan “An Opportunity for National Service.” The goal was $10 million to support the business school and departments of chemistry and fine arts. This was to be undertaken in the traditional style of discretely approaching wealthy benefactors. Far from balking, Lowell joined the nine-person committee, along with the university treasurer, two members of the Corporation, and Bishop Lawrence, his cousin, as chair.


Led by a gift of $5 million for the business school from banker George F. Baker, the entire goal was virtually achieved by June 1924.216 Coupled with $3 million promised in 1923 to Harvard’s Institute of Biology by the International Education Board, Lowell’s nine-person committee had nearly matched in eighteen months what the HEF legions had secured in ten years. And Lowell’s committee had scarcely needed Lawrence’s hat to keep their records. In his annual reports, Lowell gave at least as much notice to his “ten-million-dollar campaign” as he had to the HEF. This was way the raise to money, he seemed to say. 217 After all, Baker, one of the wealthiest men in America, had donated only $100,000 to the HEF campaign. Mass fundraising left a great deal of money in the pockets of the wealthiest donors.


Given this, it might be argued that the transformation wrought by the HEF drive was chimerical. The HEF enshrined broad-based fundraising campaign in higher education, but the outcome of the campaign, coupled with the Opportunity for National Service, put in doubt whether such fundraising actually moved higher education philanthropy outside the province of the wealthy social elite. John Price Jones Inc. and Cutlip—advocates of professional fundraising—maintained that the HEF did so. But Jones did not recognize Lowell’s Opportunity for National Service drive as a campaign, and Cutlip regarded it as an anomalous throwback.218 In effect, Jones and Cutlip redefined higher education fundraising to mean only the mass campaign, usually guided by professional consultants. Mass giving transformed higher education fundraising because the traditional mode did not count in their eyes.


Like Hadley at Yale, Lowell thought this was nonsense. In the early 1920s Lowell doubted that the HEF drive had changed much about higher education fundraising. When a college considering whether to employ Jones’s consulting firm wrote to Harvard in 1925 asking about the firm’s work, Lowell had his secretary reply that “President Lowell personally knows nothing about the John Price Jones Corporation.”219 And Lowell was right that the distribution of gifts would not change. In the HEF campaign, the top 10 percent of largest donors gave merely 36 percent of the amount pledged.220 This proportion demonstrates that the drive was heroic, but the proportion and the return on the effort of Lowell’s “ten-million dollar campaign” was much closer to the continuing norm. Today, about 90 percent of the proceeds of campaigns in higher education generally come from about 10 percent of the donors.221 That was norm at Harvard before and after the HEF,222 which apparently constituted an exception, not a new norm.


Yet, perhaps the HEF and Lowell, together, transformed higher education fundraising. Following two different strategies, they raised nearly $27 million between 1915 and 1925, and this combination is something that neither they nor Jones and Cutlip nor subsequent observers appreciated. But the two-fold effort between 1915 and 1925 demonstrated that the financially strongest institutions would be those that harness mass fundraising together with discretely tapping large fortunes.223 Furthermore, the successive drives at Harvard commenced the future pattern that “campaigns today are often continuous. As one ends, another one begins.”224 Unintentionally and uncooperatively, the HEF and Lowell commenced the ubiquitous episodic pattern of continuous fundraising in which mass comprehensive campaigns alternate with discrete solicitations of wealthy donors. Therein lies the paradoxical transformation effected by the first businesslike comprehensive multi-year national campaign in higher education fundraising.


Notes


1. Ohio State Launches $2.5 Billion Dollar Fundraising Effort (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Media Relations Office, 2012).

2. Thomas W. Lamont to Edgar H. Wells (March 22, 1917). Unless otherwise noted letters to or from Lamont are in Thomas W. Lamont Correspondence, Harvard Endowment Fund Records, Harvard University Archives, box 1916–17 and box 1918–1921.

3. Quotation is from Eliot Wadsworth, Harvard Endowment Fund, Harvard and the Future (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Endowment Fund, 1919), 23.

4. Isaac L. Kandel, “Endowments, Educational...United States,” in A Cyclopedia of Education, ed. Paul Monroe, vol. 2, (New York: Gale Research Company, 1911–1913), 458–9. See Jesse B. Sears, Philanthropy in the History of American Higher Education (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922), 38; Ernest V. Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 200; Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 52; Robert Bremner, American Philanthropy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 85, 106; Merle Curti and Roderick Nash, Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 41, 56, 91, 110, 164, 211; Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 264; Roger L. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900-1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10.

5. Scott M. Cutlip, Fund Raising in the United States: Its Role in America’s Philanthropy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 203–4, 110.

6. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 39–47, 81–86, 110–53; Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 44–75.

7. John Price Jones, The American Giver: A Review of American Generosity (New York: Inter-River Press, 1956), 12; Merle Curti, “Foreword,” in Cutlip, Fund Raising, xxxvi; Cutlip, Fund Raising, 110–53; Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 44–75.

8. George P. Day, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Yale College 1904-05, (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1905), 12–15; Clarence Deming, “Yale’s Larger Gifts,” Yale Alumni Weekly, March 17, 1911, 634; George C. Holt, “The Origin of the Yale Alumni Fund,” Yale Alumni Weekly, February 2, 1917, 528–9; Archibald J. Allen, Anything Is Possible: The First 75 Years of the Yale Alumni Fund (Hartford, CT: Yale Alumni Fund, 1965), 2–36. cf. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 49–50; Brooks M. Kelley, Yale: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 276–7.

9. Edward B. Reed to Lamont (c. 19 April 19 1918); Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1905-06 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1906), 53–54; Harvard College Class of 1891, Sixth Report, Supplementary (Alexandria, VA: 1916), 40; Charles W. Eliot, University Administration (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1908), 66.

10. Lamont to A. L. Lowell (21 March 1917), President Abbott Lawrence Lowell Records, Harvard University Archives, box 76, f. 713; Lamont to C. C. Little (5 April 1917); Duncan to Lamont (27 March 1917); Timothy Dwight, Annual Report of the President of Yale University for the year 1898 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1898), 134–6; Arthur T. Hadley, Annual Report of the President of Yale University 1900-01 (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1898), 26; William Lawrence, Memories of a Happy Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1926), 211–20.

11. Quotations are from Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 123, 44–5. See Curti and Nash, Philanthropy, 164.

12. Quotations are, respectively, from W. Bruce Cook, “Fund Raising and the College Presidency in an Era of Uncertainty: From 1975 to the Present,” in Philanthropy, Volunteerism & Fundraising in Higher Education, eds. Andrea Walton and Marybeth Gasman (Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing, 2008), 631; Noah D. Drezner, “Philanthropy and Fundraising in American Higher Education,” ASHE Higher Education Report 37, no. 2 (2011): 7–8. See K. E. Dove, “Changing Strategies for Meeting Campaign Goals,” in Handbook of Institutional Advancement, ed. A. W. Rowland, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1987), 292–309.

13. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 480. See Seymour Harris, Economics of Harvard (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 298–9.

14. Jones, American Giver, 14; Bremner, American Philanthropy, 138; Cutlip, Fund Raising, 480; Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 50; Harris, Economics, 298–9; Dwight Burlingame, ed., Philanthropy in America: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), vol. 1, xxxiii; Marybeth Gasman and Noah D. Drezner, “Fundraising as an Integral Part of Higher Education,” in Walton and Gasman, Philanthropy, Volunteerism & Fundraising, 595; Drezner, “Philanthropy,” 5.

15. Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917).

16. Harvard Endowment Fund Committee, Records...1916–1939, Harvard University Archives; John Price Jones Co. Collection, Records 1919–1954, Special Collections, Harvard Business School Library, 12 cases plus 702 volumes; Records of the President of Harvard University, Abbott Lawrence Lowell, 1909–1933, Harvard University Archives, 244 document boxes and 11 volumes..

17. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 169–74, 200. See John Price Jones Corporation, A Nation-Wide Survey of Fund Raising (New York: The John Price Jones Company, 1926); Jones, American Giver; Curti and Nash, Philanthropy, 203–5; Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 48, 50, 297; Frank H. Oliver, “The Roots of Academic Fund Raising,” in Walton and Gasman, Philanthropy, Volunteerism & Fundraising, 602; Drezner, “Philanthropy,” 5; Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 48–9. Though informative and insightful at many points, Harris, Economics of Harvard, is disorganized, often unreliable in its documentation, and filled with misleading presentist comparisons about Harvard’s finances spanning three centuries. Other historiography about Harvard in this period does not discuss the campaign, including Samuel E. Morison, Three Centuries of Harvard, 1636-1936 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936); Samuel E. Morison, The Development of Harvard University since the Inauguration of President Eliot 1869-1929 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); Richard N. Smith, The Harvard Century: The Making of a University to a Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 27–100; Morton Keller and Phyllis Keller, Making Harvard Modern: The Rise of America’s University (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 145–51.

18. Bremner, American Philanthropy, 138; Cutlip, Fund Raising, 172–4, 200; Harris, Economics, 271, 298–9, 302, 308; Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 48, 50; Burlingame, ed., Philanthropy in America, vol. 1, xxxiii; Drezner, “Philanthropy,” 5; Oliver, “Roots,” 602. cf. Henry A. Yeomans, Abbott Lawrence Lowell 1856-1943 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), 230, 250–3.

19. See Perkins to Mrs. A. H. Rice (19 August 1920), Thomas N. Perkins Correspondence, HEF Records; Harvard College Class of 1898, Fourth Report (Alexandria, VA: 1923), 531–3.

20. Lamont to Lowell (24 December 1918).

21. Lamont to John J. Jones (December 1916).

22. Lamont, “Ten Million Dollars for Harvard: Endowment Fund Committee Plans Far-Reaching Campaign to Meet Pressing Needs of the University,” Harvard Alumni Bulletin 19 (January 11, 1917), 285.

23. Lamont to Wells (22 March 1917).

24. Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917). See Lamont to George D. Markham (22 March 1917).

25. Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917). See Lawrence, Memories, 215; George A. Brakely to Wells (28 September 1920), John Richardson Correspondence, HEF Records.

26. Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (24 November 1916, 9 April 1917), HEF Records; Duncan to and from Lamont (23 September, 20 October, 29 November 1916, 18 April 1917); Lamont to Prentiss (6 December 1916).

27. Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917); Lamont to Markham (22 March 1917); Duncan to and from Lamont (23, 27, 29 March 1917); Lamont to C. C. Little (5 April, 1917); “Harvard ‘Grads’ End Three-Day ‘School’,” Boston Globe, July 31, 1919, 12.

28. Lawrence, Memories, 215.

29. Duncan to Lamont (10 July 1918); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (30 September, 25 October 1919).

30. Roger Pierce to F. W. Burlingham (16 April 1918), Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17.

31. Eliot, Annual Report 1906-07, 52.

32. Lowell to Ezra R. Thayer (16 November 1914), Dean Thayer Correspondence Subject Files, Law School Dean’s Office Records, Harvard University Archives, box 1. See Lowell to Ezra R. Thayer (24 July 1914) and Henry L. Higginson to Lowell (9 December 1911), Lowell Records, box 38, f. 1232.

33. “News and Views. Ten Millions for Harvard,” Harvard Alumni Bulletin 19 (January 11, 1917), 281.

34. Lamont to Theodore Lyman (11 December 1916); Lamont to Carroll Dunham (26 March 1917); “News and Views. Ten Millions for Harvard,” 281.

35. Lowell to Lamont (26 September 1916).

36. Perkins to Wadsworth (10, 18 May 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

37. Eliot, University, 66; Eliot, Annual Report 1886-7, 165; Eliot, Annual Report 1898-9, 50.

38. Holt, “Origin”; Allen, Anything Is Possible.

39. Lamont. “The Harvard Graduates Endowment Fund” typed sheet, c. 1915., Lamont Correspondence. See Pierce to Burlingham (16 April 1918).

40. Lamont. “Arguments for the Fund” typed sheet, c. May 1916., Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17; Lamont. “The Harvard Graduates Endowment Fund;” HEF Subscription Form (1917), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

41. Burlingham to Duncan (12 February 1918) Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne. See Roger Pierce to Lamont (3 July 1916); Lowell to James Byrne (4 December 1924), Lowell Records, box 196, f. 354.

42. Harvard Alumni Association Board of Directors, “Resolution,” October 20, 1924; Jerome D. Greene and John W. Prentiss form letter. (20 October 1924), Lowell Records, box 196, f. 354.

43. See Eliot, University, 72–75; Chandler, Visible Hand; letters between Duncan and Lamont (September–December 1916).

44. Lamont to Duncan (18 January 1918). See Richardson to Lamont (17 May 1916).

45. Pierce to Lamont (3 July 1916); Lamont to Fred S. Thompson (7 July 1916).

46. F. W. Burlingham to Lamont (12 February 1918). See Thomas W. Slocum, Report of the Associated Harvard Clubs Endowment Fund Committee, April 18, 1917; and letters among Slocum, Lamont, and Burlingham (11, 12, 13 September, 2 October 1916), Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17.

47. Lamont to Duncan (18 January 1918).

48. Quotation is from Pierce to Burlingham (16 April 1918). See Burlingham to and from Lamont (12 February, 23 April 1918); Burlingham to Duncan (26 February 1918); Burlingham to Charles Jackson (21 April 1919), and Draft of HAA Constitution March 1919., Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne; Wells to Wadsworth (7 June 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–1921.

49. Duncan to Lamont (c. November 1916); Lamont to John J. Jones (c. December 1916); Lamont to Thomas T. Baldwin (20 December 1916); Lamont to James G. King (10 January 1917).

50. F. W. Burlingham to and from Duncan (28 March, 15 December 1917); G. C. Kimball to Duncan (15 July 1919); Duncan to E. M. Grossman (2 December 1919), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne.

51. Quotation is from E. M. Grossman to John Price Jones (26 July 1919) Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne. See Burlingham to Duncan (12 February 1918); Grossman to John Price Jones et al. (24 July 1919), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne.

52. Lamont to Wells (20 January 1919).

53. Wells to Wadsworth (7 June 1919). See Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (6 May, 24 November 1916); “Men Europe's Chief Need,” New York Times, July 28, 1919, 3; “Harvard Fund $7,959,097,” New York Times, October 25, 1919, 11; Prentiss to Lamont (14 April 1916); Lamont to and from Duncan (30, 31 January 1917); Wells to Lamont (13 January 1917); Anonymous to Howard Elliott (15 January 1917), Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17. See Lawrence, Memories, 218; Upton Sinclair, The Goose-Step: A Study of American Education, rev ed., vol. 1 (Girard, KS: Kessinger Publishing, 1923), 64.

54. Guy Emerson to Lamont (27 November 1918); Duncan to Lamont (9 January, 5 March, 2 June 1917); Wells to Lamont (21 July 1919); “Canvassers in Fall Will See Every One of 36,000 Ex-Students. . . . ” Boston Globe, July 31, 1919, 12; Eliot Wadsworth, Campaign Book of the Harvard Endowment Fund Committee, 9, 12, 24 pp., typescript (Jun. 1919)., Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21; “Society and Entertainment: Woman’s Committee of Harvard Fund to Meet,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 4, 1919, 21; “Committee on Women Contributors,” Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925, HEF Records, 1 box; Wells to Lowell (20 May 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981; Harvard Endowment Fund Bulletin No. 18. Give and Find One More Giver for Harvard, Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37; “Harvard Fund $8,092,403,” New York Times, October 27, 1919, 16.

55. Lamont to Daniel Kelleher (31 January 1917); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (24 November 1916, 8 January 1917); Duncan to Lamont (15, 28 December 1916, 4, 26, 29, 31 January, 20 April 1917); Lamont to Ernest B. Dane (8 January 1917); Wallace B. Donham to Lamont (9 September 1916); Lamont to Charles S. Fairchild (30 January 1917); William Lawrence, “An Invigorating Avocation,” Atlantic Monthly 132, September 1923, 322; Wells to John B. Atkins (28 November 1919), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne; Wadsworth. to Lowell (4 February 1920), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

56. Lamont to Daniel Kelleher (31 January 1917). See Duncan to Lamont (21 December 1916).

57. “Call for Harvard. After Fund of $10,000,000. Nation-wide Drive Is Launched,” Boston Globe, January 11, 1917, 1, 5; Lamont, “Ten Million,” 284–6; Richard. M. Saltonstall, “Harvard’s New Endowment,” Harvard Graduates Magazine 25, March 1917, 310–14; U.S. Commissioner of Education, Report. for the Year Ended June 30, 1916 (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1917), vol. 2, 253–319.

58. Letters among Lamont, Duncan, Lowell, and various alumni (May and June 1917) and Duncan, “Report of My Recent Trip West” (16 May 1917), Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17; Lamont to Lowell (7 June 1917); “New Harvard Fund Reaches $1,187,160,” New York Times, July 8, 1917, 19.

59. Quotation is from Lamont to HEF Committee (30 December 1918). See Lamont to George B. Case (24 December 1918).

60. Lamont to Wadsworth (23 January 1919). See Harvard College Class of 1898, Fourth Report, 531–3; Lamont to Duncan (16 January 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981; letters in Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21, f. 1919.

61. Wells to Lamont (13, 26 March, 3, 16 April5 5 June 1919); Wells. to Lowell (2 May 1919), A. L. Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

62. Harvard College Class of 1897, Sixth Report (Alexandria, VA: 1922), 588–9; Harlan B. Phillips, Reminiscences of Guy Emerson, Columbia University Oral History Collection (1951; Glen Rock, c. 1972.).

63. Lamont to Wadsworth (23 January 1919). See Lamont to Wells (20 January 1919); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (30 September 1919).

64. “Every Harvard Man Is Expected to Give,” New York Times, August 11, 1919, 12; Guy Emerson to Lamont (27 November 1918); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (11 June 1919); Wadsworth, Campaign Book.

65. Quotations are from “Organize Harvard Grads. More Than 4,000 to Serve Daily in $11,000,000 Campaign,” New York Times, July 31, 1919, 9. See Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (11 June 1919); “Harvard ‘Grads’ End Three-Day ‘School’,” Boston Globe, July 31, 1919, 12.

66. Wadsworth. to Lamont (7 July 1919). See Wadsworth to Lowell (26 June, 18 July 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; Wadsworth, Campaign Book; “Harvard Endowment Fund --Old Grad’s School Jul. 28-30, 1919,” Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981a; Wadsworth., “Programme for Old Grad’s Summer School,” Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21.

67. “Harvard Calls Old Grads,” New York Times, July 14, 1919, 20; “Harvard Old Grads Go Back To School,” New York Times, July 27, 1919, 25; “Men Europe’s Chief Need;” “Harvard ‘Grads’ End Three-Day ‘School’,” Boston Globe, July 31 1919, 12; Wadsworth., “Programme,” “Organize Harvard Grads,” 9.

68. Abbott Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green, 1913), 58.

69. Quotation is from Lamont, “Ten Million,” 285. See Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (6 May 1916; 8 January 1917); Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917); Duncan to Lamont (9, 20, 26 December 1916, 4, 9, 14 January, 17 February, 29 March 1917); “News and Views. Ten Millions for Harvard,” 281–2; Lamont, “Ten Million,” 284–6; Lamont to William C. Sanger (31 March 1917).

70. Wadsworth, Campaign Book, 12, 14, 22–24. See John Price Jones. to local chairmen, Memo explaining how to organize and publicize visit by Eliot Wadsworth., Eliot Wadsworth Correspondence, HEF Records.

71. John Price Jones to Lamont (23 September 1919).

72. Quotation is from F. Hoffman to John Price Jones (4 August 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21. See Lamont to and from John Price Jones (1 August, 23, 24 September, 9 October 1919); F. Hoffman to John Price Jones (2 August 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21.

73. John Price Jones, Harvard College Class of 1902, Fifth Report Personal Report., 266; “Harvard Drive to Start Next Week,” Boston Globe, July 17, 1919, 11; John Price Jones to and from Lowell (3, 5 February, 2 August 1919) and Duncan to Lowell (21 May 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; John Price Jones to Lowell (29 September 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 198.

74. Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (19 May, 11 June, 30 September, 18 October 1919); Duncan to William H. Baldwin (16, 17 July 1919) , Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne; John Price Jones to Lamont (9 August, 23 September 1919); David M. Little to Wadsworth (4 December 1923), Wadsworth Correspondence; Wadsworth to and from Lowell (24, 25 June 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; John Price Jones to and from F. Hoffman (2, 11, 25, 30 August 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21.

75. Lamont to Wells (22 March 1917).

76. Lamont to Kelleher (31 January 1917); Lamont to Eugene DuPont (13 February 1917); Lamont to William M. Chadbourne (13 March 1917); “To Find All Harvard Men,” New York Times, August 24, 1919, 25; Harvard Endowment Fund Bulletin No. 9. Memorandum Showing How Deductions from Taxable Incomes Made Possible by Gifts to Harvard Endowment Fund in the Calendar Year 1919. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Endowment Fund, 1919), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37; Lamont to Joseph W. Fordnay and Boies Penrose (17 February 1920).

77. Ten Millions for Harvard... Reprinted from the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Jun. 26, 1919 (New York: Harvard Alumni Bulletin, 1919), n.p. See Lawrence, “Invigorating,” 322; Emerson to Lamont (27 November 1918); Wadsworth, Campaign Book, 12; Prentiss to Lamont (19 September 1919); Richardson to Prentiss (1, 8 February 1921), Richardson Correspondence.

78. Prentiss to Lamont (13 November 1916). See Donham to and from Lamont (9, 12 September 1916); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (24 Novevmber 1916).

79. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1909-10, 22–23. See Lowell, 1910-11, 19–20; Lowell, 1912-13, 13.

80. Duncan to Lamont (29 November 1916). See Lamont to Alexander Forbes (13 March 1917).

81. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 5. See “News and Views. Ten Millions for Harvard,” 281; “Why Harvard Needs Money,” Harvard Alumni Bulletin 19, January 18, 1917, 306.

82. “Harvard Fund $15,250,000. Committee Announces Increase in Amount Sought in Drive,” New York Times, September 18, 1919, 15.

83. Lamont to Lowell (7 June 1917).

84. Lamont to Lowell (24 December 1918). See letters between Lamont and Lowell in f. Jan.–Oct. 1919, Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21.

85. Quotation is from Lamont: “Harvard’s New Endowment...an Attempt to meet the University’s increasing needs,” five-page typescript (c. Feb. 1917)., 2–3, in Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17. See Lamont, “Why Harvard Needs Additional Endowment,” The Harvard Advocate, September 22, 1919, 9–11; Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 4–6; “Why Harvard Needs Money,” 306; Lamont to form letter. (24 February 1917); Saltonstall, “Harvard’s,” 310.

86. Perkins to form letter. (11 December 1920), Richardson Correspondence. See Perkins to Geoffrey M. Hyams (24 September 1919), Perkins Correspondence; Eliot Wadsworth to Division and District Chairmen (23 December 1920), Richardson Correspondence; Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 2; “News and Views. Ten Millions for Harvard,” 281; Lamont to form letter. (24 February, 1917).

87. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 7.

88. Lamont, four-page typescript, c. Dec. 1916., Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17; Lamont, “Ten Million,” 285; “New Harvard Fund,” 19. See Bruce A. Kimball and Benjamin A. Johnson, “The Inception of the Meaning and Significance of Endowment in American Higher Education, 1890-1930,” Teachers College Record 114, no. 10 (2012): 1–32.

89. Bruce A. Kimball and Benjamin A. Johnson, “The Beginning of “Free Money” Ideology in American Universities: Charles W. Eliot at Harvard, 1869-1909.” History of Education Quarterly 52 (2012): 222–250.

90. Eliot, Annual Report 1905-06, 54–55. Quoted in Wadsworth, Campaign Book (rev. ed.), 1–2; Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 8; “Dinner to Members of ‘The Old Grads’ Summer School’ and Their Professors...Jul. 29, 1919,” Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21; Lamont; “Providing for the Future of Harvard,” typescript, April–May 1919., Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981a. See A Message to You from President Eliot printed broadside., Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981a; To All Harvard Men...Charles W. Eliot to Eliot Wadsworth (23 Aug. 1919) printed broadside., Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37.

91. Lamont to Dunham (26 March 1917). See Lamont, “Arguments”; Saltonstall, “Harvard’s,” 312.

92. Lowell to Lamont (30 January 1917). See Odin Roberts to Lamont (6 January 1919).

93. See George P. Day to Alfred P. Ripley (24 January 1919), George P. Day letters, series II, Yale University Secretary Records, Yale University Archives, box 37, f. 475.

94. Lamont to Lowell (7 June 1917). See Lamont, “Ten Million,” 285; Lamont to Dunham (26 March 1917); Allen, Anything, 6.

95. Roger Pierce to Lamont (15 July 1915).

96. Lamont to Lyman (11 December 1916); Lamont to Dunham (26 March 1917); Lowell to Lamont (26 September 1916); Lamont to George B. Leighton (14 March 1917), to H. S. Hunnewell (17 January 1917), and to Ernest B. Dane (12 January 1917); Lowell to Odin Roberts (7 February 1917), Harvard Endowment Fund, Lowell Records, box 76, f. 713.

97. Correspondence among Lamont, Duncan, Lowell, Henry S. Hunnewell, Richard Saltonstall, Augustus Hemenway, James Byrne, F. H. Nash, Alexis I. Dupont, Theodore W. Richards (December 1916–March 1917), in Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17, and Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records, and Lowell Records, box 76, f. 713.

98. Lamont to and from Lowell (29, 30 January, 5 February, 3 May 1917); Duncan to and from Lamont (9, 10, 15 February, 5 March 1917); Lamont to R. M. Saltonstall (30 January 1917). See Lamont to Roger Pierce (8 February 1917); Odin Roberts to Lamont (1 February 1917); Lamont to Herbert L.. Clark (c. February 1917); Lamont to HEF Committee (c. 5 March 1917); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (9 April 1917); HEF Subscription Form, Correspondence with restricted subscribers, HEF Records, box 2.

99. Wells to Lowell (20 May 1919). See E. H. Wells to E. M. Grossman (21 July 1919), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne; Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 23.

100. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 23. cf. 9, 11–22. 24. See Lamont to Saltonstall (30 January 1917); Wadsworth, “Programme,” 4–5; “Harvard ‘Grads’ End Three-Day ‘School’,” Boston Globe, July 31, 1919, 12; Wadsworth, Campaign Book, 2–4.

101. “Harvard Endowment Fund Total $13,945,536,” Boston Globe, January 30, 1924, 4. See Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925.

102. Lamont, Four-page typescript, c. Dec. 1916.. See Wadsworth,. Harvard and the Future, 4, 8; Saltonstall, “Harvard’s,” 310; Eliot Wadsworth, “Pamphlet- Introduction,” typescript draft., 3-8, in Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925.

103. “News and Views. Ten Millions for Harvard,” 281. See Lamont, “Ten Million,” 284; “Lowell Asks Aid For Harvard Fund,” New York Times, August 17, 1919, 25; “Men Europe’s Chief Need;” Lamont to HEF Committee members (30 December 1918); “To Get Europe’s Students,” New York Times, August 25, 1919, 14; “Lamont Pleads for American Colleges,” New York Times, September 27, 1919, 13; Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 1–3, 8; Perkins to Hyams 24 September 1919; Lamont to Robert J. Beeckman (15 October 1919).

104. Thomas Reed Powell to HEF (6 November 1919), Correspondence with restricted subscribers, HEF Records, box 1. See Lamont to Daniel C. Jackling (30 October 1919).

105. Lamont, “Harvard’s New Endowment,” 2–3.

106. Lamont to form letter. (23 March 1917). See Lamont, four-page typescript, c. December 1916.; Lamont, “Harvard’s New Endowment;” Saltonstall, “Harvard’s,” 310–11.

107. Duncan to Lamont (16 December 1916).

108. Jerome D. Greene to Lowell and Wadsworth (22 August 1919), Wadsworth Correspondence. See Lamont to Beeckman (15 October 1919).

109. Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (11 June 1919). See Lamont to form letter. (23 March 1917); “Harvard Salaries Far Behind Prices,” Boston Globe, January 26, 1917, 9; “Harvard Professors Get 44 Percent Less Than in 1908,” Boston Globe, March 26, 1917; “Editorial Points,” Boston Globe, March 28, 1917, 10; Lamont to Stephen B Stanton (26 April 1917); Harvard Salaries and the Cost of Living printed pamphlet, March 1917., Lamont Correspondence, box 1916–17.

110. “Would Pay Teachers More,” New York Times, September 8, 1919, 5. See Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 2–4; “Men Europe's Chief Need”; “Lowell Asks Aid For Harvard Fund,” New York Times, August 17, 1919, 25; “To Get Europe's Students,” New York Times, August 25, 1919, 14; “Harvard to Start War on Cliques,” New York Times, September 15, 1919, 6; “Harvard Fund $15,250,000”; “Lamont Pleads For American Colleges,” New York Times, September 27, 1919, 13; “Coolidge's Victory Helps Harvard Fund,” New York Times, November 9, 1919, E1.

111. A. L. Lowell, “To All Harvard Men” electrotyped letter. (15 September 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

112. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 6.

113. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 4.

114. “Universities Ask Over $200,000,000,” New York Times, February 8, 1920, E1.

115. Lamont to William C. Sanger (12 April 1917). See Lamont to Lowell (13 December 1916); Jerome E. Greene to Wallace Buttrick draft. (22 August 1919), Wadsworth Correspondence; Charles F. Adams to Duncan (13 August 1919), Adams Correspondence, HEF Records, box 1; Wadsworth to Lowell (19 August 1919); and Lowell to Wadsworth draft letter., Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; Perkins to John Oenslager (10 November 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

116. Lamont to Lowell (24 December 1918).

117. F. W. Hunnewell to Wells (10 April 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21; Lamont to Lyman (11 December 1916); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (8 January 1917); Lamont, “Ten Million,” 285; Lamont, “Harvard’s New Endowment,” 1–2; “Call for Harvard;” Saltonstall, “Harvard’s,” 313.

118. “Harvard ‘Grads’ End Three-Day ‘School’,” Boston Globe, July 31, 1919, 12; “Europe Still Needs Man Power from America,” New York Post, July 30, 1919; “Men Europe’s Chief Need.”

119. Wadsworth, Campaign Book (rev. ed.), 2–5.

120. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 9, 11–24.

121. “$15,250,000 Harvard Endowment Fund” printed broadside, c. Oct. 1919., Lamont Correspondence, box 1918-21; Lamont, “Why Harvard Needs,” 9; “$25,000 Is Fee to Join this Club,” Boston Herald, September 23, 1919; “Lamont Pleads for American Colleges,” New York Times September 27, 1919, 13; “Harvard Fund $15,250,000.”

122. Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 9; “Harvard Wants $11,060,000. Endowment Fund Committee Raises Its Objective $1,000,000,” New York Times, July 28, 1919; Lowell, Annual Report 1918-19, 19–20; Perkins to James J. Phelan (2 October 1919), Perkins Correspondence, box 1. See Arthur G. Powell, The Uncertain Profession: Harvard and the Search for Educational Authority (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 128–136.

123. Wadsworth, “Pamphlet- Introduction,” 2–3. See Wadsworth, Harvard and the Future, 5; Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 131.

124. Hunnewell to Wells (10 April 1919). See Lowell to Wells (5 May 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

125. Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917); Lamont, four-page typescript c. December 1916.; Lamont to Theodore N. Vail (12 March 1917); Lamont to F. C. Shattuck (21 March 1917); Lamont to Eugene DuPont (13 February 1917); Wells to Lamont (17 April 1919).

126. Howard Bowen later codified this truism as the “revenue theory of cost.” The Costs of Higher Education: How Much Do Colleges and Universities Spend per Student and How Much Should They Spend? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), 15.

127. Wadsworth, Campaign Book, 15. See Lawrence, “Invigorating,” 322; Cutlip, Fund Raising, 48–53, 88; Oliver, “Roots,” 606–7; Letters among members of HEF Executive Committee (November 1918–April 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21.

128. Quotation is from Duncan to Lamont (14 January 1919). See Cutlip, Fund Raising, 38–40, 45, 75, 81–88.

129. Lamont to Lowell (24 December 1918). See Emerson to Lamont (27 November 1918); Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917); Duncan to Lamont (14 January 1919).

130. Emerson to Lamont (27 November 1918). See Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917).

131. Duncan to Lamont (14 January 1919). See Lamont to Lowell (24 December 1918).

132. Duncan to Lamont (14 January 1919).

133. Wells to Lamont (21 June 1919); Wadsworth, Campaign Book, 14.

134. Lamont to Alexis DuPont (1 October 1919). See “Harvard Drives for 15 Million,” Washington Post, October 1, 1919, 20; “Harvard Endowment Fund Reaches $1,904,545,” Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1919, 16; “$1,745,000 for Harvard,” New York Times, October 2, 1919, 21; Wells to Lamont (21 July 1919); Jerome D. Green to Lamont (22 August 1919); Lamont to Charles E. Schweppe (12 August 1919); “$25,000 Is Fee to Join this Club,” Boston Herald, September 23, 1919; Edward N. Weld to Perkins (October 2, 1919), Perkins Correspondence, box 1; Wadsworth to Lowell (20 August 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

135. Lamont to Hugh M. Langdon (11 October 1919).

136. Wadsworth to Lowell (20 October 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

137. Perkins to Frank P. Sears (26 November 1919), Perkins Correspondence, box 2. See “Harvard Endowment Fund Passes Half-Way Mark,” Chicago Tribune, October 27, 1919, 12; “Harvard Fund $8,092,403,” New York Times, October 27, 1919, 16; “Harvard Endowment Fund $9,601,560,” New York Times, November 14, 1919, 13; F. W. Hunnewell to Wadsworth (10 November 1920), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37.

138. On these events, cf. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 173–5, 200. Jones later wrote, “I became general manager of the Harvard Endowment Fund. When that Fund was practically raised, I took over a good part of the clerical staff and formed The John Price Jones Corporation.” Jones, Personal Report, 266.

139. D. W. Abercrombie to John Price Jones (24 September 1919), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne. See John Price Jones to President, Worcester County Sons of Brown University (20 September 1919), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne.

140. “JPJ Journal of financial transactions., 1919-26,” 2, John Price Jones Co. Collection, Records, box AL-1. See John Price Jones to and from Lamont (20, 22 September 1919).

141. John Price Jones to Lamont (6 October 1919). But Jones never accorded his three younger associates—Duncan, Harold J. Seymour, and Chester E. Tucker—due recognition or compensation for their efforts over a quarter of a century, and they all eventually left his firm. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 176; Robert F. Duncan, “A New Force in American Society, Fifty Years of Dynamic Philanthropy, Final Master Copy” typescript. (9 October 1969), John Price Jones Co. Collection, Records, box BW-1.

142. Perkins to John V. Paine (28 November 1919), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

143. Duncan?., Secretary’s Notebook (December 17, 1919). See Wells to Lowell (12 December 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; Lamont to and from Henry S. Pritchett (22, 23 December 1919).

144. Burlingham to Duncan (12 February 1918); Wells to Lamont (21 July 1919); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (17 December 1919); Perkins to Alvah Crocker (9 December 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 1; David M. Little, “The Harvard Endowment Fund” typescript. (c. June 1923), Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925.

145. Wadsworth to Perkins (4 December 1919), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37. See Perkins to Lowell (4 December 1919) and Wadsworth to Lowell (6 December 1919), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37.

146. Lowell, Annual Report 1919-20, 5–6; Wadsworth to Perkins (4 December 1919); Lowell to Wadsworth (11 December 1919); Wadsworth to F. L. Allen (19 December 1919), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37; “Harvard Salaries Increased 20 Per Cent, Endowment Fund Expected to Allow Another Advance Next September,” New York Times, January 29, 1920, 6; “Harvard Profs get a 40 to 50% Salary Increase,” Chicago Tribune, March 17, 1920, 3; “Harvard Faculty Grateful,” New York Times, April 19, 1920, 14.

147. John Price Jones, How to Conduct Campaigns for Funds for Colleges typescript. (1920), 1–3, John Price Jones Co. Collection, Records, box BL-1. See Lamont to Jackling (30 October 1919); Wells to Atkins (12 November 1919); “With the College Drives. Harvard Fund $9,763,164—Cornell and Smith Plan Campaigns,” New York Times, November 16, 1919, 20.

148. “Universities Ask Over $200,000,000,” New York Times, February 8 1920): E1. See Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 126–7.

149. John G. Hibben to Lowell (24 September 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981.

150. “Mr. Wadsworth’s Report on Commencement Day Jun. 24, 1920,” Wadsworth Correspondence. See “Harvard Fund $11,989,335,” New York Times, March 1, 1920, 14; Wells to Frank Aydelotte (24 February 1920) and Wells to Charles Q. Adams (10 June 1920), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne; Wells to Perkins (31 March 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

151. Quotation is from Lamont to Peter G. Gerry (22 December 1920); Wadsworth, form letter (23 December 1920) and Prentiss form letter. (20 October 1920), Richardson Correspondence. See Prentiss to Wallace B. Donham (18 May 1920) Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

152. Prentiss to Lamont (7 October 1920).

153. Perkins to Robert L. Gerry (8 December 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 1.

154. Prentiss form letter. (20 October 1920). See Records of Intensive Class Campaign, Richardson Correspondence.

155. See Lamont to Alexis DuPont (6 December 1920); Wadsworth to Charles H. Schweppe (30 November 1920), Wadsworth Correspondence; letters in Richardson Correspondence, 1 box, and Perkins Correspondence, box 1.

156. Guy Emerson to Richardson (12 December 1920), Richardson Correspondence. See Perkins to Crocker (9 December 1920); Anonymous to Richardson (30 November 1920), Richardson Correspondence; Perkins to Gerry (8 December 1920); Perkins to Charles W. Eliot (24 November 1920); and J. P. Morgan to Lamont (17 November 1920), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21.

157. Wadsworth, form letter (23 December 1920); David M. Little to Lamont (31 October 1921).

158. Wadsworth to Lowell (7 October 1920), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records. See Wells to Lowell (20 May 1919); Duncan, Secretary’s Notebook (19 May 1919); Lamont, “Arguments;” Roberts to and from Lamont (6, 11 January 1919); Slocum, “Report of the Associated Harvard Clubs;” Lamont to Carroll Dunham (15 March 1917); Duncan to F. W. Burlingham (16 February 1918), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne; Henry S. Thompson to Wadsworth (6 August 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981; Wadsworth to form letter. (23 December 1920); Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 44–5.

159. Perkins to Charles W. Eliot (24 November 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

160. John Price Jones to David M. Little (6 March 1922), Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925.

161. “Harvard Endowment Fund Total $13,945,536,” Boston Globe, January 30, 1924, 4; David M. Little to Mr. Barnes crossed out. (1 May 1925), Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925. See Little to and from Frank W. Hunnewell (1921–5), Hunnewell Correspondence, HEF Records; David M. Little, “Answering questionnaires etc. for Duncan and Jones” c. 1922, 1923., Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925; David M. Little to Lamont (1 March 1922); David M. Little to Lowell (15 March 1922), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37; John Price Jones to Wadsworth (26 November 1923) and Little to and from Wadsworth (December 1923), Wadsworth Correspondence.

162. Lamont to Gerry (22 December 1920); Wadsworth to form letter. (23 December 1920); Prentiss to form letter. (20 October 1920). See Lowell, Annual Report 1919-20, 5–6.

163. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 174. See Jones, American Giver, 14; Harris, Economics, 276–7, 298–9, 311. cf. Yeomans, Abbott, 251; Bremner, American Philanthropy, 138; Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 50; Burlingame, ed., Philanthropy in America, vol. 1, p. xxxiii; Gasman and Drezner, “Fundraising,” 595; Drezner, “Philanthropy,” 5.

164. “To Raise Million A Year for Harvard,” Boston Globe, June 30, 1921, 4; “Harvard Endowment Fund Still Short,” Boston Globe, November 18, 1921, 28; “Harvard Endowment Fund Total $13,945,536,” Boston Globe, January 30, 1924, 4.

165. “Harvard Endowment Fund Total $13,945,536”; “Harvard Endowment Fund as of Mar. 31, 1938,” Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925; Thomas N. Perkins to A. T. Perkins (24 November 1920), Perkins Correspondence; Wadsworth to Schweppe (30 November 1920); Perkins to Gerry (8 December 1920); Guy Emerson to David M. Little (3 March 1922), Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925.

166. Perkins to Crocker (9 December 1920).

167. Wells to Lamont (21 June 1919); Perkins to Crocker (9 December1920); Richardson to Henry M. Williams (c. December 1920) and Perkins to form letter. (11 December 1920), Richardson Correspondence; David M. Little to and from Wadsworth (5, 7 November 1921), Wadsworth Correspondence.

168. Quotations are, respectively, from Perkins to Frederic Winthrop (23 October 1919), Perkins Correspondence, box 2; Lowell, Annual Report 1921-22, 28. See Duncan to Lamont (6, 23 March 1917); Perkins to and from Frederic Winthrop (23 October, 17 November 1919); William S. Bigelow to Perkins (7 October 1919) , Perkins Correspondence, box 1; John B. Trevor to Charles T. Lovering (24 November 1920), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37; “Laski Scores Commissioner's Action in Walkout Crisis,“ Harvard Crimson, October 10, 1919; Howard Elliott to and from Wadsworth (22, 23 October 1919) and Howard Elliott to and from Lamont (22, 28 October 1919) and Peter G. Gerry to Lamont (8 January 1920) and Lamont to and from Lowell (20, 21 January 1920), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21; Yeomans, Abbott, 253; Hugh Hawkins, Between Harvard and America: The Educational Leadership of Charles W. Eliot (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 269, 273, 282–4, 290.

169. Lowell, Annual Report 1917-18, 28–30; Lowell, “Urgent Needs of the University,” Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Commencement Issue, June 26, 1919; Ten Millions for Harvard; Lowell, “To All Harvard Men”; Lowell, Annual Report 1918-19, 19–20.

170. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 172–4, 200; Harris, Economics, 271, 298–9, 302, 308. Yeomans indicates that Lowell did little, but excuses him by saying that nothing more was required. Abbott, 230, 250–1, 253.

171. Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Princeton 1746-1896 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946), 389–90; James Axtell, The Making of Princeton University: From Woodrow Wilson to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 24–5, 51.

172. Arthur T. Hadley to Lowell (24 September 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981; Wadsworth to Lowell (20 October 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records. It is noteworthy that a Yale alumnus interested in raising money to increase the salaries of Yale faculty wrote to Yale’s treasurer, not to Hadley. George P. Day to William A. Brown (26 February 1919), George P. Day letters, series II, Yale University Secretary Records, Yale University Archives, box 37, f. 475.

173. Hadley, Annual Report 1919-20, 18–19. After Hadley stepped down, the new Yale President in 1925 contacted Harvard asking to learn about the HEF campaign. Frank W. Hunnewell to David M. Little (22 January 1925), Correspondence, HEF Records.

174. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 203–4, 110.

175. Yeomans, Abbott, 230.

176. E. H. Wells to Charles F. Adams (28 April 1919), Adams Correspondence, HEF Records. See Wadsworth to Lowell (10 September 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

177. Quotations are from Ezra R. Thayer to Cornelius W. Wickersham (7 April 1914), Dean Thayer Correspondence Subject Files, Law School Dean’s Office Records, Harvard University Archives, box 2.

178. Yeomans, Abbott, 252.

179. Lowell to Wells (16 May 1918), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981. See Duncan to Lamont (23 March 1917); F. W. Hunnewell to Wells (13 March 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981; Wells to Lamont (5 June 1919); Lowell to Duncan (5 May 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

180. Lowell, Annual Report 1917-18, 28–30.

181. J. G. Schurman to and from Lowell (30, 31 January 1917), Lowell Records, box 76, f. 713; W. I. Brobeck to Lowell (28 November 1919) and F. W. Hunnewell to W. I. Brobeck (5 December 1919), Lowell Records, box 140, f. 37.

182. Lowell to Arthur T. Hadley (26 September 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981.

183. John Price Jones to Lowell (3 February 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records. See Lamont to Lowell (21 March 1917); letters among Donham, Lamont, Roger Pierce requesting Lowell’s endorsement (September 1916), Lowell Records, box 76, f. 713; Duncan to Lamont (16 1916 December, 14 February 1917).

184. Duncan to Lamont (23 March 1917).

185. Pierce to Burlingham (16 April 1918).

186. Lowell to Lamont (26 September 1916).

187. Lowell to Lamont (12 December 1916).

188. Lamont to Lowell (13 December 1916).

189. Duncan to Lamont (27 March 1917).

190. Duncan to Burlingham (16 February 1918). See Lamont to Sanger (12 April 1917).

191. Lamont to H. S. Hunnewell (17 January 1917). See Lowell to Lamont (16 January 1917).

192. Lowell to Duncan (27 February 1917), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

193. Quotations are from, respectively, Lamont to Wallace B. Donham (3 May 1917); Duncan to F. W. Burlingham (20 February 1918), Correspondence, HEF Records, box A-Byrne. See Lamont to and from C. J. Bullock (12, 26, 27 April 1917); Donham to Lamont (26 April 1917).

194. Wells to Lowell (May 20, 1919). See Pierce to Burlingham (16 April 1918); Lamont to Lowell (24 April 1918).

195. Wells to Lowell (29 March 1920), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records. See Lowell to Wells (26 March 1920), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; Prentiss to and from Wallace B. Donham (18, 24 May 1920); Wadsworth to Wallace B. Donham (25 May 1920); Wadsworth to and from Perkins (25, 26 May 1920); and Wadsworth to Prentiss (25 May 1920), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

196. Wadsworth to Lowell (19 July 1919); F. W. Hunnewell to John Price Jones (25 July 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

197. Lowell, Annual Report 1911-12, 21. See 1917-1918, 28–30.

198. Lamont to Lowell (24 December 1918).

199. Lowell to Lamont (22 January 1919). See Wells to F. W. Hunnewell (12 March 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981.

200. Hunnewell to Wells (13 March 1919). See Wells to Hunnewell (12 March 1919); Wells to Lamont (13 March 1919).

201. Wells to Lamont handwritten postscript. (15 March 15, 1919).

202. Quotation is from Wells to Lamont (26 March 1919).

203. Quotation is from Wells to Lamont (26 March 1919).

204. Wells to and from F. W. Hunnewell (9, 10 April 1919), Lamont Correspondence, box 1918–21; Wells to Lowell (2 May 1919); Wells to Lamont (17 April 1919).

205. Lowell to Wells (5 May 1919).

206. Wells to Lowell (15 May 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

207. Lowell to Wells (16 May 1918), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981.

208. Wells to Lamont (5 June 1919).

209. Wells to Wadsworth (7 June 1919); Wells to Lamont (5 June 1919); Wells to and from F. W. Hunnewell (16, 17 June 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; John Price Jones to Lowell (18 June 1919); Wells to Lowell (19 June 1919); Lowell to Lamont (20 June 1919), Lowell Records, box 135, f. 1981.

210. Lowell, “Urgent Needs of the University.”

211. Ten Millions for Harvard.

212. Lowell “To All Harvard Men.” See Wadsworth to and from Lowell (8, 12, 14, 18, 19, 28 August 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records.

213. Wadsworth to and from Lowell (20 August, 5, 11 September 1919); and John Price Jones to Lowell (9 October 1919), Lowell Correspondence, HEF Records; Lowell to Perkins (30 October 1919); and Perkins to Sears (7 November 1919), Perkins Correspondence, box 2.

214. Thayer to Wickersham (7 April 1914).

215. Wells to Lamont (21 July 1920); Perkins to Geary (6 November 1920), Perkins Correspondence; Wells, “Report of the Harvard Endowment Fund,” 170; “Subscribers who have pledges $25,000.00 and Over, Sep. 10, 1920. Corrected to Nov. 1920,” Lists, reports, statistics, etc., 1919-1925; “Table Gossip,” Boston Globe, February 13, 1921, 51. Like the restricted gifts, the HEF records about major gifts are difficult to parse.

216. “Commencement Gifts,” New York Times, June 20, 1924, 18; Lawrence, Memories, 417–20; Yeomans, Abbott, 230–1.

217. Lowell, Annual Report 1926-27, 32. See 1923-24, 27–29; 1924-25, 7–8, 1927-28, 19. Harris did not appreciate the shortcomings of the HEF campaign or Lowell’s lack of cooperation. Economics, 313.

218. Jones Corporation, Nation-Wide Survey; Cutlip, Fund Raising, 265–8. See Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 50, 126–7.

219. Frank W. Hunnewell to David M. Little (9 June 1925), Hunnewell Correspondence.

220. Wells, “Report of the Harvard Endowment Fund,” 168–70.

221. Michael J. Worth, “The Historical Overview,” 33; David R. Dunlop, “Major Gifts Programs,” in New Strategies for Educational Fund Raising, ed. Michael J. Worth (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 89–104; Drezner, “Philanthropy,” 8.

222. Lawrence, Memories, 218; Harris, Economics, 304–30; Ronald Story, The Forging of an Aristocracy: Harvard and the Boston Upper Class, 1800-1870 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1980), 27; Margery S. Foster, “Out of Smalle Beginnings...” An Economic History of Harvard College in the Puritan Period 1636-1712 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).

223. See Anson Phelps Stokes Jr., Annual Report of the Secretary of Yale University 1910-11, 80–81.

224. Drezner, “Philanthropy,” 7.






Cite This Article as: Teachers College Record Volume 116 Number 7, 2014, p. 1-44
https://www.tcrecord.org ID Number: 17488, Date Accessed: 1/25/2022 2:59:48 PM

Purchase Reprint Rights for this article or review
 
Article Tools
Related Articles

Related Discussion
 
Post a Comment | Read All

About the Author
  • Bruce Kimball
    Ohio State University
    E-mail Author
    BRUCE A. KIMBALL, Professor of Educational Studies at Ohio State University, studies the history of liberal arts education, of professional education, and, more recently, of cost escalation in higher education. Recent publications include “The Disastrous Beginning of Law School Fundraising, 1914–1920,” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (2013); “The Beginning of ‘Free Money’ Ideology in American Universities: Charles W. Eliot at Harvard, 1869–1909,” History of Education Quarterly (2012) with Benjamin A. Johnson; and “The Inception of the Meaning and Significance of Endowment in American Higher Education, 1890–1930,” Teachers College Record (2012) with Benjamin A. Johnson. He gratefully acknowledges the support provided by a Guggenheim fellowship that contributed to the research for this article, as well as the feedback from three anonymous reviewers.
 
Member Center
In Print
This Month's Issue

Submit
EMAIL

Twitter

RSS