

CHAPTER 8

Deliberative Democracy and Civic Education

In this chapter Lars Løvlie develops a view of the kind of public conversations that Callan and Benhabib lament as missing from existing democracies in the United States and France. Løvlie contends that civic education requires that we pay more attention to teaching people how they might talk with one another and to deciding what to talk about.

Democratic practice involves many problem-solving methods, especially discussion or deliberation. Løvlie distinguishes between moderate deliberation, which is embedded within existing practices and assumptions, and strong deliberation, which directly challenges both. In deciding what is good and true, the former works within a local framework and the latter aims at a broader, more universal horizon. Both are required for full democratic citizenship.

While much citizenship education deals with topics like law and government, ordinary political discourse actually focuses on common concerns or *topoi* that all humans must confront, including freedom and justice, love and friendship, tolerance and solidarity. These existential topics examine situations inherent to the human condition and require the kind of special attention that Løvlie recommends in describing strong deliberation. Absent considerations of democratic *topoi*, Løvlie argues, education for democratic citizenship can be formal and empty.

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*Deliberative Democracy and Civic Education*¹

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Two radical political events serve as background for today's civic education. One prepared the ground for the European Union and a new future for Europe; the other led to the failed invasion of Iraq. The first was the spectacular fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, recalled in the pictures of triumphant youths from East and West Germany standing on top of it—pictures that came to symbolize the fall of the Soviet empire. I travelled to Berlin the next spring to experience the demise of the German Democratic Republic and the calm and even reserved political anticipations of people on both sides of a border that faded away early that memorable autumn. I went up to the wall not far from Checkpoint Charlie and collected some pieces of the gray, hardened concrete that had been chipped away. The pieces had the rough touch of a history at its end and set my thoughts on what at that time seemed a brighter future for democracy. The next radical event was the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of September 11, 2001. The first news of the cataclysm came to me and my wife in Paris in the early afternoon, from an American woman. I could hardly believe what we later watched on French television and could not dream of the aftermath: the United States trying to impose democracy on Iraq at gunpoint, against the protest of many thousands of people marching in the streets of capital cities across Europe. An education for liberal democracy cannot fail to take these events into consideration, if only because they show how fragile democracy is in the uneasy balance between arguable success and abject failure. These two events call for an education that prepares people to participate more fully in democratic public life. In particular, I propose two components for civic education: (1) cultivation of the capacity for the kind of rational discourse needed for collective democratic deliberation and (2) concern for ongoing analysis of existential *topoi* or recurring topics endemic to the human condition.²

“Deliberative,” a term that dates to the eighteenth century European Enlightenment,³ is a key democratic concern that relates to a spirit of rational criticism, to a constitutional liberal-democratic government, and to the political institutions that assure democratic principles of freedom and justice. Indeed, the link between deliberation and political education has been a major concern of many twentieth century thinkers who follow John Dewey in understanding the state as a “political

public” created by “associated activity” and “articulated” by its political representatives.⁴ In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, however, scholars like Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, largely motivated by the spectre of the Holocaust, have shifted attention from preparing people to participate in a democratic society to understanding and critiquing the basis for democratic participation. Indeed, as I contend below, what is at issue between Dewey and Habermas is partly the difference between moderate and strong versions of democratic deliberation.

Often given short shrift in accounts of democratic participation and deliberation, however, is consideration of subject matter, that is, what are people talking about? Much current democratic scholarship is concerned with distinctions such as liberal-communitarian, norms-values, public-private—all important matters for debate. These discussions, however, bypass a roster of ethical and political *topoi*, or common topics, that all humans must confront, including, for example, freedom and justice, love and friendship, tolerance and solidarity. These *topoi* are found in analyses of the human condition by scholars like Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Martha Nussbaum and by novelists like Knut Hamsun, Toni Morrison, and José Saramago. Consider love as a *topos*. Love is neither a rational procedure for problem solving, like inquiry, negotiation, or argumentation; nor a personal virtue like courage, compassion, or humility, important as these are in themselves. Love is part of common human experience rather than an individual personality trait or disposition. What I call existential topics range across genre boundaries and are indeed often better described in novels and poems than in philosophical tracts. *Topoi* describe the “places” where persons meet and events happen, the emotions they stir, the actions they instigate, and the stories they engender. They are not personal in the sense of belonging uniquely to you or me. *Topoi* are expressed in the stories we like to tell rather than in the methods we are likely to use; they involve reflection and discretion rather than conclusions and decisions.

Deliberation and the Educational Point of View

What is the educational point of view? Some would say that as long as there is learning, that is, as long as interaction leads to changes of mind and habit, we are generally within the ken of the educational. This cannot, however, mean that any kind of process that makes a change in someone’s cognitive repertoire or social habits is educational. I may

certainly learn something from stumbling on the stairs or getting stuck in the rush hour traffic, but that does not necessarily make my learning educational. Better candidates are the intentional learning of complex skills like reading and writing, adding and multiplying, and mastering the Internet. In addition to imparting competences and skills, the general task of education is to inculcate those lasting imprints of tradition that make young people grow up acting and thinking like us. Traditionalists see education as initiation into the bourgeois mores—getting the barbarians inside the citadel of civilisation, as R.S. Peters once had it.⁵ More liberal thinkers take a more explicit stand for fostering autonomy and critique. They want to impart political insight and reflection and to make students aware of the subtle—or not so subtle—power mechanisms in democratic society, and to improve their political judgment and habits. They try to sustain the ideas of democratic thinkers from Kant to Habermas, that citizens should be able to recognize their best moral intentions in the political institutions they create and transform.

Democratic civic education pursues democratic ideals in the making of the curriculum, and in the ongoing interaction between teachers and students from the very first school years. When the curriculum and the textbook are not assigned absolute authority, the teacher is free to fashion authority in her ongoing work with students. And since there can be no legitimate final authorization of a canon of educational texts in a democratic society, she and her colleagues are free to discuss the paradox, “There is no canon, thus we need to make one!” and thereby question established opinion. When local authorities lessen control by statutes and regulations, teachers and students are free to discipline themselves in inquiry and cooperation. When individuals are seen in their double description as defined and indefinable, and as unique spirits, the teacher can appreciate the fine balance between giving her verdict and withholding it, between accepting the rhetoric of authority and acknowledging a common fallible future. The ideal of mature responsibility therefore cannot be taken for granted, but must be nurtured over years of cooperative practice between teachers and students. This is the educational point of view, and the starting point for a full discussion of deliberative democracy as an educational enterprise.

Deliberation—the Moderate Version

Democratic practice is a mix of problem-solving methods including discussion, negotiation, bargaining and voting. Many everyday conflicts are solved by discussions, often involving elements of negotiation, and

they may reach a final decision only by casting a vote or flipping a coin. Participants in moderate deliberation require many skills, including the dispositions that we appreciate and even admire in people who are good at discussions, whether they take place in the schoolroom, at work, on the radio or on television, as long as the rules of fair discussion and negotiation are obeyed. Examples of such skills include turn-taking, listening carefully to others, respectful language, and getting to the point.

Moderate deliberation is embedded within a practice and does not necessarily challenge that practice, that is, it seeks the good rather than the true. The good is assumed to be embedded in local traditions and everyday common sense; indeed, the good citizen is someone who is able to make good judgments in the midst of the nitty-gritty details of everyday life. The context is typically the community or nation in its local settings. Within moderate deliberation the fears and hopes, the curiosity and optimism of young people have their place and range. A common example is the negotiation of class rules between teachers and students at the beginning of a school year. Typically the teacher poses a challenge to create the norms that the students will abide by during the school day and sometimes the recourses available to settle disputes or violations of those norms. What is seldom negotiated are ways to deal with the power imbalances, the need for rules or how or whether the rules will apply to teachers as well as students. At the school level, discussions about attendance policies in secondary schools are usually about the promptness and behaviour of students; seldom is the behaviour of teachers or administrators up for public debate. The assumptions of the school are taken for granted by (almost) all.

Linking the descriptions of the two recent epic political events that I describe in my opening paragraph is certainty about what constitutes “democracy” and how people relate to one another in that democracy. The East German government was, after all, the “German Democratic Republic,” and all deliberation was constrained by a version of democracy consistent with a socialist communism. The Bush administration was equally confident it was providing true democracy to the people of Iraq. In neither case were challenges to foundational assumptions welcomed; that would require a different, stronger version of deliberation.

What, then, are the implications for civic education? Some seek to foster moderate deliberation about the topics covered in the prescribed textbook about the founding fathers and the democratic institutions they helped to create, and to initiate discussions in the classroom on current political issues—on immigration, discrimination, or some local

conflicts. Others want students to take part in school-related practices, like representing one's fellow students on the school council or local student or school board or, as is tried out in Norway, acting as an "ombudsman" for students who have complaints against education authorities. Such practices may be helpful in developing political knowledge, civic virtues, and deliberative skills, but they may fall short of the ultimate aim of deliberative education, which is the rational justification of moral and political claims. The answer to the question: "Do we need all this fuss about truth and justice in our schools?" is "Yes," provided that the link to the democratic political tradition is made clear and that we see rational discursive practices in the wider educative settings. Digging underneath everyday assumptions is to probe into the repressed and undisclosed and requires a stronger version of deliberation.

Deliberation—the Strong Version

Strong deliberation involves the very matters assumed in moderate deliberation: rights and norms. It requires rational discussion with all affected and aims at achieving agreement about what is true and just. The formal constraints for strong deliberation include respect for all others, the right for all to speak, adherence to the facts of the case, and the need for justification—whether you want to dispute a fact, press a political view, or persuade the other of the qualities of the last film you watched. In short, the aim of such discourse is to establish the validity of normative statements by rational debate within a universal, rather than local, horizon.⁶ The benefits of strong deliberation include more than determining the ways that people will live with one another, however. The discipline of this form of dialogue can create personal bonding that goes beyond cognitive skills and leaves a residue of mutual goodwill, which is the formative effect of practices like UN modeling or community work. We respect others because they think and act according to principles, that is, they stand for something we believe is important. Assessing norms according to rational principles engenders, in the best of cases, reliability and trust in a common pursuit.

Strong deliberation has its preferred domains. Its principles seem perfectly appropriate when we address human rights in general, or argue for free speech, religious freedom, and the right to a fair trial on the national level. They also work on the institutional level, as when university professors defend their right to free research, or when secondary school students protest that national test results be made public on Internet school leagues. Educating for strong deliberation aims at

helping people learn to interact in the inquiring attitude, to treat claims as hypotheses to be tested, and to see the results of debate as preliminary and open to further discussion. Strong discourse requires skills like expressing a problem, picking out its salient features, laying out its scope, formulating one's claim, arguing one's case, respecting the other's right to disagree, working toward a possible agreement and accepting the final verdict even if it goes counter to one's own cherished beliefs.

What have we learned at the end of the day from entering into a strong discourse? In everyday life we are confronted with situations of doubt and disagreement and we can choose to seek resolutions beyond those of coercion or seduction, violence and repression. Argumentation offers itself as a civilizing means of resolving conflicts in a highly differentiated society because it is based not on local values, habits, and traditions, but on taking the perspective of all into account. For the early teenager whom we try to nudge into democratic thinking, this abstractness is still a tall order, because she is wont to relate socially and emotionally to particular others. It seems of little avail to imagine her in the position of an objective judge wielding general principles. For her the emotional openness towards the other's predicament, however, can prepare the road to sympathy and moral understanding. It seems the only thing a wise teacher could reasonably ask of the student is to forgo her own inclinations, interests, and prejudices for the moment, and identify with others including, for example, immigrants, homosexuals, and single mothers.

Let us, however, pursue the impartial point of view a bit further. Impartiality means that we are asked, in particular situations, to take a universal perspective. The abstraction from both personal prejudice and conventional public opinion makes way for the point of view of all possible participants in discourse, even if the setting for the discussion is local and the persons affected are, for all practical purposes, you and your fellow citizens. Universality is a valid ideal even if the participation of all is factually limited by class, talent, and luck. The opposition between real and ideal does not, as we shall see, scorn real discourse but rather belongs to it as a motivating force. Just to take an example: Despite the fact that nationality, class, family, and access to education systematically exclude some people from taking part in political discourse, we may include them in principle—the ideal of inclusion has, after all, been a main political motive in the effort to spread democracy to the poor and underprivileged in Western social democracies in the twentieth century.

The Transcendental Wager and Existential *Topoi*

The relationship between the real and ideal is, of course, an enduring theme in Western thought and has been a critical democratic consideration beginning with Kant, who explains that “human reason has the peculiar fate . . . that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the very nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason.”⁷ Kant finds in human reason and imagination important tools to help humans make sense of their lives—and exercise their democratic freedom and responsibility to do so—but with the proviso that we can never be completely successful. To presume that we are capable of understanding ourselves and the natural and social worlds is hubris, yet we cannot help but take our lives seriously. We must attempt to transcend our finitude, our mortality, with the realization that we can never completely succeed. Democracy depends on this transcendental wager. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, more recent democratic theorists, build on the real-ideal relationship in their efforts to create more democratic societies, but with opposite orientations. Habermas is concerned to use the ideal to measure the real: Actual discourses can be assessed by how close they approximate the “ideal speech situation,” where all are included and consensus is the ultimate goal. Derrida, in contrast, wants to emphasize the incompleteness and distortions of attempts to approach the ideal. He is concerned to uncover forgotten displacements, hidden power imbalances, and contradictions, and is always suspicious of “agreement.”⁸ I contend that both orientations are required for democratic politics. Indeed, Habermas and Derrida each contribute insights to understanding 9/11.

Habermas emphasizes the failure to approach or respect democratic ideals. Political injustice can, according to Habermas, be explained by distorted communication, that is, by “misunderstanding and incomprehension, from insincerity and deception.”⁹ On this thinking the flouting of international conventions is a case of illegitimate politics, to be set right by appeal to human rights, national legislation, rational argumentation, and political responsibility. Teaching the truth of matters political, instilling the virtue of sincerity in public life, educating students in rational discourse procedures, and strengthening the democratic governance of schools and universities would be among his educational remedies.

Derrida, on the other hand, stresses the inadequacy of any final comprehension of 9/11; he says that “. . . what remains ‘infinite’ in this

wound, is that we do not know what it is and so do not know how to describe, identify or even name it.”¹⁰ On the face of it this seems rather dodgy, since the world still reels under the footage and the analyses of what followed the Twin Towers catastrophe. But Derrida’s point lies elsewhere, in the impossibility of a final understanding or closure of what took place in New York on that September morning. Derrida reminds us that injustice is not only carried out in the name of justice, but is rather part of it. He points to ongoing contradictions within efforts to achieve justice—to the fact, for example, that refugees, asylum seekers, and alien residents find themselves on the fringes of national legislation and are seldom heard. Derrida reminds us that we can never achieve perfect justice; instead we must continuously strive to construct and reconstruct the political and existential conditions to approach justice, using what Seyla Benhabib wants to call “democratic iteration.”¹¹ Similarly, since we can never fully implement democracy, we have to put our hope in the “democracy to come,” putting “faith in the possibility of this impossibility . . . from the point of view of knowledge, science, and conscience that must govern all our decisions.”¹²

Existential Topoi

Much democratic education focuses on topics like some of the ones we have just mentioned: law, democracy, and nationhood and on equipping people with the requisite knowledge and skills needed to fulfill the office of citizen. Ironically, social reality—the very stuff of people’s everyday existence—is not up for discussion. Here I want to argue for the inclusion of the ordinary in political education, that is, I wish to add concerns for existential topics or *topoi*. *Topoi* are existential rather than personal, that is, they belong to the human condition in the inexhaustible variety of its local and personal expression. Consider C.S. Lewis’s account of affection, friendship, eros, and charity in *The Four Loves*. Each is woven into the author’s narrative and conversation with the reader, but none could be mistaken for a personal virtue.¹³ *Topoi* range from the commonplaces in weeklies and journals to the conversations between teachers and students in the classroom. They are recurrent life themes or topics that we keep on talking about in private and public, and they latch the private on to a wider variety of common concerns. *Topoi* can have non-linguistic features. Embedded in the rhyme and rhythms of poetry they colour our relations with others; embodied in the pains and passions of dancing they furnish the choreography of our thoughts and actions.

An example of the exploration of a democratic *topos* might help, albeit one explored in a very sophisticated manner. In *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*, Giovanni Borradori discusses tolerance with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Both refer to the conditionality of tolerance: that it depends on one person's or group's power over another, that tolerance is a favor given and withheld or withdrawn at will. Habermas discusses the problem of tolerance-intolerance within the constitutional state by referring to the rights conferred on citizens by the constitution. Universalism plays a role here, but the most important feature, according to him, is “. . . the peculiar character of reflexivity that constitutional principles enjoy”;¹⁴ that is, the possibility of self-critique inherent in democratic institutions. Habermas perceives tolerance as a lopsided relationship that constitutional thinking and action can put right.

Derrida follows a somewhat different path. Asked whether tolerance can be the condition of hospitality, he flatly answers that it is the opposite of hospitality: Tolerance “is a conditional, circumspect, careful hospitality. Or at least its limit,” he insists.¹⁵ A person invited into someone's home enjoys hospitality on the condition that she behaves according to the local, unspoken, rules of decorum; inadequate behaviour exposes the limitation of hospitality. The invitation of a stranger can turn hospitality into hostility.¹⁶ Derrida plays on *hospes-hostis* (hospitality-hostility) as the etymological root of hospitality, and thus sheds light on the basic inclusion-exclusion practices in modern democracy. For Derrida tolerance nourishes intolerance, as witnessed by the exclusion of the outsider who does not conform to the conditions of tolerance. The relevance of this analysis for our understanding of attitudes toward immigrants and outsiders seems obvious—with the stranger as the limit case *par excellence*. Pure hospitality is, Derrida says, “practically impossible to live.” It cannot be defined or organized, it has no legal or political status, and it seems to be beyond our powers and altogether of no practical significance. Yet, he continues, “. . . without this pure and unconditional hospitality . . . we would have no concept of hospitality in general.”¹⁷ Actual hospitality survives because we imply pure hospitality in our interaction with the other, that is, make it part of the practice of hospitality. Situated in this *topos* we are bound to “re-inscribe” the pure into our everyday life.

Educators, that is, both parents and teachers, are familiar with the challenges of teaching tolerance. From an early age, for example, children need to accept the presence of others in the world, often beginning with learning to share toys and play peacefully with other children.

Teachers of young children consistently help children learn to abide by a version of Kant's categorical imperative, that is, act as if your actions would be a rule for all, usually cast as a version of "How would you feel if. . .?" Older children often learn to include others in their sense of identity—sometimes at the cost of the exclusion of those who are different. Teaching tolerance becomes a matter of helping people learn to discriminate among the differences that do not matter from those that do matter—while retaining the flexibility and humility necessary to avoid rigid categories. Teaching adolescents how to be community members, for example, involves a continuum from helping some learn to form any kind of association to assisting others understand how to withdraw from harmful associations (e.g., being a member of a perhaps soon-to-be-criminal gang).

Topoi for Democratic Education

Absent consideration of democratic *topoi*, schooling for democratic citizenship can be formal and empty. The irony of current efforts to improve education by pressing for accountability using certain testing schemes, for example, is that such regimes may hinder or even prevent educational teaching. While educational teaching needs methods, method cannot take the form of algorithms or prescribed "best practices." *Topoi* require interpretation for particular people in specific contexts rather than generic application; they are essential to a flourishing or self-examined life. The *topoi* mentioned previously—and the list is easily prolonged—describe everyday situations within given cultural horizons, that is, "places" where thinking dwells. *Topoi* are embedded in commonplace stories that cannot be appropriated by dogma or scientific theories, or configured into local mores or canonized or solved. They cannot because they describe experiences endemic to the human condition that require unique responses to new and always emerging questions. *Topoi* are made for wondering, exploring, and looking for new insights.

These points of view pose challenges to an education for deliberative democracy. The first challenge to education issues from the force of "pure" *topoi*, that is, for example, pure hospitality; it is met by interrogating its double-faced character, its tension of ideal and real. The second challenge issues from knowledge moulded by the finite-infinite relation; it is met by paying attention to the subtle and indefinable particular experiences that characterize our relations to nature, literature and the arts—"a sense sublime of something far more deeply

interfused,” as William Wordsworth once had it. The third challenge is to jettison the narrow parochial perspectives of civic education practised under the guise of “objective” teaching; it is met by the courage to go beyond local traditions and prejudices towards a world-wide human commitment, realised in a cosmopolitan education. The fourth challenge is to resist the senseless twaddle that often follows from accepting any whims and fancies of teachers and students as relevant in political discussions; it is met by a regime of rational discourse that establishes reasonable common rules for arriving at defensible political judgment and action. The fifth challenge is to exploit the possibilities of the Internet in looking up the facts, collecting diverse arguments, and creating new arenas for interaction and learning; it is met by implementing the innovations of the Web in the schoolroom by going beyond “learning platforms” to blogging and to the exploration of life in virtual communities.¹⁸ Democracy is molded by geopolitical events, as shown by the destructions of the Berlin Wall and the Twin Towers and their aftermaths. Since there is no neutral ground in politics, there is no neutral ground for a civic education. That is where education for deliberative democracy using the *topoi* has its beginning.

Finally, perhaps the most appropriate *topos* for civic education is education itself. Education is a contradictory process; the very struggles at the heart of education defy closure. These struggles bear witness to a life of restlessness as well as of promise and hope. In this context authenticity and autonomy as the “rights” that modernity has bestowed on its citizens become fragile political goods that are transformed and never finalized through history. Yet, in the face of disappointments and defeat we never stop presenting self-realization and freedom as the hope and aim of education. We cope with fragility because the alternative to the paradoxical freedom inherent in aims that cannot materialize means stagnation and the repetition of the same. We cope because perfect knowledge means the death of wisdom, perfect self-realization the death of self, and perfect education the death of education. So our most cherished aims had better remain, in Derrida’s words, parts of “impure” processes that are never finalized and thus leave us free to explore our finitude. In this sense Derrida gives us the gist of a different education, by saying that “The self, the *autos* of legitimating and legitimated self-foundation, *is still to come*, not as a *future* reality but as that which will always retain the essential structure of promise and as that which can only arrive as such, as *to come*.”¹⁹ To teach for a definite future is to take the future away from the student, to teach for an infinite future is to take the future back.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Joseph Dunne and David Coulter for valuable comments on the text.
2. I will briefly mention a third component, namely democratic virtues, which I regard as interpersonal rather than purely personal.
3. "Deliberation," for example, is implicit in Kant's idea of "publicity" and explicit in Burke's idea of the parliament as a "deliberative assembly" and in Mill's idea of "government by discussion."
4. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1927), 67.
5. R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation," in *Philosophical Analysis and Education*, ed. R. D. Archibald (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 107; also in R. S. Peters, *Authority, Responsibility, and Education* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973). By this metaphor Peters deconstructs his own idea of a rational liberal education. Children do not, of course, start off as barbarians, and Peters' metaphor is thus rather uncivilized.
6. See Lotte Rahbek Schou, "Kan retfærdighed læres?" ("Can Justice Be Taught?"), in *Pædagogikkens filosofi*, ed. Anne-Marie Eggert Olsen (Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 2004), 148ff. For a very relevant discussion, see Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, with Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig, and Will Kymlicka, ed. Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
7. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 99.
8. See especially Jacques Derrida, *Aporias* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).
9. Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 35.
10. *Ibid.*, 94.
11. See Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, for fine-tuned analyses of this question.
12. Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*, 115.
13. I am grateful to Maria G. Amilburu for commending Lewis's book to me.
14. Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*, 41.
15. *Ibid.*, 129.
16. See John D. Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 109ff.
17. Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror*, 129.
18. I am thinking particularly of exploration and participation in virtual worlds, like Second Life. I have explored the creative force of the Internet in Lars Løvlie, "Technocultural education" (2006), <http://www.seminar.net/volume-2-issue-1-2006/>.
19. Jacques Derrida, *Who's Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 22.